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Abstract 
The future of humanity is dependent on saving the environment from global 
warming caused by CO2 emission from electricity generation and transportation 
systems. The remedies are the increasing in the penetration of renewable energy 
in electricity generation and electric vehicles (EVs) in transportation. The main 
operational problem associated with a high wind penetration and EVs comes from 
intermittency and unpredictability. The power systems are likely to face 
increasing uncertainties in both generation and load sides and there is no 
coordination between them. In addition, EVs might impose excessive load on the 
grid. Therefore, coordinating the EV aggregator with the generating companies in 
the electricity market can enhance the stability of the power system via 
unidirectional vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technology. 
This thesis concentrates on the impact of the participation of the EV load 
aggregator and wind power, and the coordination strategy on the market 
outcomes and prices.  
Firstly, power exchange between the wind generating companies (WGenCos) 
and EV load aggregators considered as price-takers in the energy and ancillary 
service markets is modelled and analysed. A two-stage stochastic linear 
programming-based optimal offering/bidding strategy model is developed for the 
coordinated EV-Wind units participating in the day-ahead energy, balancing, and 
regulation markets. In future electricity markets, the EV aggregator will have a 
more important role with high penetration of EV numbers. Finally, the EV 
aggregator as price-maker which is in generation portfolio of single and multiple 
strategic firms including WGenCo and conventional generating companies 
(CGenCos) is modelled and investigated. A stochastic optimal bidding/offering 
strategy is developed for the EV load aggregator providing the energy and 
ancillary services in coordination with single and multiple strategic firms in a 
pool-based electricity market with endogenous formation of day-ahead and real-
time prices, and EV aggregator tariff. 
The methodology consists of using stochastic optimization categorized into 
single and multiple optimization problems. In the single optimization problem, 
WGenCo and EV aggregator considered as price-takers aim to maximize their 
objective function associated with equality or inequality constraints. In multiple 
optimization problems, the strategic firms such as WGenCos, EV aggregators, 
and other players considered as price-makers, submit supply-offers/demand-bids 
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to the market operator to participate in the electricity market. A bilevel 
(hierarchical) model is used in this thesis to model the behaviour of each player. 
A bilevel problem includes an upper-level problem and a set of lower-level 
problems which are limited by the upper and lower equality and inequality 
constraints. 
Throughout the thesis, both analytical proofs and numerical examples are 
provided to review the market analysis of EV aggregator, CGenCo and WGenCo 
and the coordination strategy.  
The numerical results show the effectiveness of the coordination strategy, 
which is profitable and beneficial with increasing EV penetration in comparison 
with the incoordination strategy. We conclude that EV aggregators as an 
individual firm could not compete with other conventional, dispatchable 
companies. Hence, merging EV aggregators in CGenCos’ and WGenCos’ portfolio 
would increase the payoff of EV aggregators and strategic firms. However, a 
sufficient EV number is a significant factor to affect market and EV aggregator 
outputs. Moreover, the numerical results show that the EV tariff and numbers at 
EV-level can influence the market price and power generation at wholesale-level 
in the electricity market. In addition, the high penetration of EVs leads to 
increasing the wind power penetration and reducing the wind power curtailment. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Preface 
Electric power generators, transportation systems, and residential houses 
contribute 41%, 23%, and 6% of the world greenhouse gases, respectively [1]. The 
strong dependence on foreign energy sources known as “oil addiction”, the growing 
awareness of global warming impacts of CO2 emissions, and high energy efficiency 
are the driving forces for the increase in the penetration of renewable energy and 
electric vehicles (EVs) [2, 3].  
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Electric Vehicles 
Initiative (EVI) members, with about 63% of the world’s total vehicle demand, 
plan to consider 83% of EV sales by 2020 [4]. The Global Wind Energy Council 
has reported that wind power could supply up to 17-19% and 25-30% by 2030, 
and 2050 of the global electricity supply, respectively [5].   
Therefore, power systems are likely to face increasing energy imbalance in both 
generation and load in the near future. Turning a load on/off or 
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increasing/decreasing the demand can be effective to balance power in the grid. 
The coordinated control of the number of EVs (controllable loads) can potentially 
balance power in the grid [6].  
A mechanism is necessary to integrate the electrified transportation within the 
power system and encourage EV owners as active players in the electricity market 
[7-8]. Unidirectional vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technology is a mechanism whereby the 
EV load aggregators in a sizeable number can participate in energy and ancillary 
services markets due to much faster ramping capability than gas turbines and a 
cheaper approach than energy storage systems [9-10].  
EV aggregators as new market players have to compete with other market 
players while motivating the consumers to take part in the market. Moreover, the 
increasing penetration of EVs is another factor that contributes to energy 
imbalance [11]. 
Wind generating companies (WGenCos) participate in electricity markets 
despite their uncertainty to maximize the expected payoff, similarly to the other 
market producers with consideration of WGenCo as price-maker market players. 
Both wind generation uncertainty and energy price fluctuations are contributing 
factors to the decrease of the competitiveness of WGenCos in the energy market 
[12].  
The main operational problem associated with a high wind penetration and 
EVs comes from intermittency and unpredictability. Also, EVs might impose 
excessive load on the grid [2]. Therefore, price and the market outcomes are 
influenced by the participation of the wind power and EV loads in high 
penetration [13].  
This dissertation considers market analysis to investigate the influence of 
unidirectional V2G and wind power in the future smart grid.  
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1.2 Review of Current Trends in Integrating Electric 
Vehicles into Grids 
There have been several studies on the integration of EVs into power systems [14-
21]. In distribution systems, [22-26] evaluate the impact of EVs charging on the 
power quality such as voltage profile, harmonic and power losses. In [27-31], 
optimal scheduling for charging of EV is evaluated. Optimal siting and sizing of 
EV charging stations are considered in [32-34]. In transmission and generation 
systems, the benefits of V2G technology to a power system are investigated [35-
38]. 
The first step to use the V2G technology is the economic aspect of EV 
aggregators. Several studies have also covered the economic aspects of integrating 
EVs into electricity markets [39–40]. Simulations have shown that EVs acting as 
smart storage can provide fast and accurate responses for frequency regulation 
and spinning reserves to aid in the integration of wind and solar power [10]. The 
definition of V2G is the provision of energy and ancillary services to the 
electricity grid from EVs [41-43].  
EV participation in the energy and ancillary service markets has been 
investigated in several studies. In [9], the EV participation considered 
bidirectional V2G interactions. Although V2G can be both unidirectional and 
bidirectional, the unidirectional V2G is expected to be implemented first as it 
requires fewer infrastructures and reduces battery degradation by not requiring 
additional cycling for bidirectional power flow [8]. In [8-9], unidirectional smart 
charging with EV participation in the energy and regulation markets is studied 
without considering the stochastic nature of the process.  
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Stochastic modelling of aggregated EVs and their impact on the optimal load 
profile of the power system is presented in [9]. However, discharging cost is 
considered constant and is not affected by depth of discharging (DoD) in these 
studies. 
Currently EV usage is in its initial stage; when EV penetration becomes strong 
and influences the grid parameters, control of a large number of EVs to balance 
the entire power system will represent a challenge for power utilities. Several 
studies have demonstrated the benefits of coordination between wind power 
generators and EVs in power networks [44-49]. The authors of [50] have examined 
the effect of EV integration in a wind-thermal power system on emissions 
produced. In [51], a stochastic unit commitment model is used to simulate wind-
thermal power system scheduling with different charging patterns for EVs to 
reduce the operating costs of a power system. However, these studies did not 
consider the intra-hour variability of the EV charging behaviour and wind energy 
generation which limit potential benefits of energy dispatch in the power system. 
In [52], coordinated wind-EV in three energy dispatching approaches, i.e., valley 
searching, interruptible and variable rate dispatching, is used without considering 
economic issues. Study [7] proposed coordinating unidirectional (V2G) services 
with energy trading. In [7], EV aggregators did not participate in the regulation 
market. In [53, 39], it has been shown that the highest benefits for EV owners are 
expected through participation in regulation markets. 
There is a lack of a study on the impact of high wind penetration and EVs on 
the energy and balancing markets equilibria for the coordinated strategy in the 
literature. However, the limited works study the impact of wind power 
uncertainty on market equilibria [13]. In [54], an offering strategy for a wind 
power producer with market power that participates in the day-ahead market as a 
price-maker and in the balancing market as a deviator is proposed.  
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Unlike [54], in [55], the producer is a price-taker in the day-ahead market, but 
a price-maker in the balancing market, and aims at optimizing its expected 
revenue from these market floors. 
In [13], the equilibrium problem in a pool-based two-settlement electricity 
market is investigated where wind power is included in the generation portfolio of 
strategic producer in addition to its dispatchable units. Also, in [56], the bidding 
strategy of the EV aggregator is formulated as a bilevel problem to take into 
account the EV aggregator to potentially influence market prices without 
considering the impact of EV tariff and real-time market.  
Therefore, in almost all previous studies, the EV aggregators have been 
considered as price-takers with exogenous formation of EV aggregator tariff. 
However, with high penetration of EV numbers, EV aggregators will have a more 
important role in the future electricity market [2].  
1.2.1 Common Modelling Assumptions 
The main modelling assumptions considered via this dissertation are described in 
this section. 
A. Stochastic Programming Problems 
Decision-making problems in the electricity market include imperfect (incomplete) 
information due to uncertainties in wind speed, energy prices, and the number of 
EVs [57].  In decision making under uncertainties, stochastic programming is used 
to make optimal decisions throughout multiple plausible scenarios of each 
stochastic variable . There are two sets of decision variables in two-stage 
stochastic programming problems including here-and-now (first stage) and wait-
and-see (second stage) decisions. The here-and-now decisions are made before the 
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realization of the stochastic variables. The wait-and-see decisions are made based 
on the realized scenarios. Hence, the first stage decisions affect the second stage 
decisions [7,57-58]. 
B. Scenario Generation and Reduction Techniques 
Appropriate scenario generation and reduction methods are necessary to properly 
represent the stochastic programming problems. There are several different 
scenario generation and reduction techniques for stochastic programming [59]. 
The Monte Carlo simulations are applied to generate scenarios in [59]. In [60], 
time series models are used to generate scenarios for prices in electricity markets. 
The most common scenario-reduction technique is based on Kantorovich distance 
[61]. In [62], a scenario generation and reduction technique for price forecasting is 
based on the roulette wheel mechanism. 
In this dissertation, scenario generation and reduction techniques are used for 
simulating wind speed, energy price, and the number of EVs engaged as follows. 
 Wind and Energy Price Scenarios 
Wind speed forecasting for the next day can be obtained from numerical 
meteorological programs, however, forecasts are never perfect. The Auto 
Regressive Moving Average (ARMA) model is used to simulate wind speed 
forecast errors [57, 63-65].  
The estimation and adjustment of ARMA models have been investigated in 
literature. In this thesis, the first order of the ARMA model, ARMA (1,1), is used 
to simulate wind speed forecasting errors.  
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Once a large number of scenarios are generated, the wind speed scenarios are 
transformed into power scenarios through the power conversion curve for each 
wind turbine [12,65].  
Similarly, Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models have 
been applied to forecast electricity prices, which appear non-stationary when the 
processes present a periodic or seasonal pattern [57, 65-66]. The details of the 
methods are described in Appendix A.1. 
 EV Penetration Scenarios 
The EV availability at each interval has associated unplanned departure and 
arrival probabilities. The number of EVs is considered to be random, and Monte 
Carlo simulations are used to generate possible scenarios [9,35,66]. The details of 
the methods are described in Appendix A.2. 
 Scenario Reduction 
In stochastic optimization problems with various inherent uncertainties, a large 
number of scenarios can emerge. It can, therefore, be computationally expensive. 
Therefore, a technique for reducing the number of scenarios is required.  
In this dissertation, the scenario reduction algorithm is based on [67,68]. The 
basic idea of the scenario reduction is to eliminate scenarios with low-
probabilities, and cluster similar scenarios [12,67,68]. The new probability of a 
preserved scenario is determined as the sum of its initial probability and the 
probabilities of similar scenarios that have been eliminated. We used SCENRED 
as a tool for scenario reduction [69]. The details of these methods are described in 
Appendix A.3. 
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C. Competition Modelling of the Electricity Market 
The electricity market is categorized into two kinds of competition comprising 
perfect and imperfect competitions [70-71]. In the perfect completion model, the 
participants are price-takers and their decisions do not affect the market price 
because of their small potential output. In the imperfect completion model, some 
strategic players (participants) affect the market price through their decisions. 
The electricity market most commonly includes a few strategic players as price 
makers and some (a number of) participants as price takers. Imperfect 
competition can be modelled using the Cournot model, the Bertrand model, or 
the Supply Function model.  
1. The Bertrand model: In this model, competition among players is in prices 
[72]. A player offers a price to maximize its profit and the market decides the 
production quantity [73.  
2. The Cournot model: In this model, competition among players is in quantity 
[72]. A player maximizes its profit by an optimal quantity in the Cournot 
model, and the other player’s quantity is considered to not be changed 
[73,77-82].  
3. The Supply Function model: this model is an extension of both the Bertrand 
and Cournot models [72]. Each participant submits the supply function offer 
to the electricity market including quantity and price offers. The Supply 
Function model is suitable for the pool-based market compared with 
Cournot, and Bertrand [72,83-85].  
In [86], Supply Function models have been applied in the British Electricity 
Spot Market.  
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In [87], pure strategy Nash equilibria have been developed when GenCos 
participate through a supply function by formulating as a mixed-integer linear 
program (MILP) that does not require any discretising approximations. 
In [88], a stepwise supply function model has been used in which a producer 
submits a set of stepwise price-quantity offers to the market operator (MO). 
In [89], the impacts of large-scale integration of intermittent resources (such as 
wind energy) on electricity market prices using a supply function equilibrium 
(SFE) model have been studied. 
In this dissertation, an SFE model is used in which Conventional Generating 
Companies (CGenCos), WGenCos, and EV aggregators submit supply-
offers/demand-bids to the MO [88]. 
 
1.3 Mathematical Structures of Electricity Markets 
The combination of regulated (old) and deregulated (new) electricity markets 
with either perfect or imperfect competition leads to complementarity models. 
These problem comprise of multiple optimization problems in which primal 
(power quantities) and dual variables (prices) are constrained together [71]. 
The mathematical structures of the electricity market can be categorized into 
single and multiple optimization problems [71].  
In a single optimization problem, the WGenCo and EV aggregator as price-
takers aim to maximize their objective function associated with equality or 
inequality constraints as explained in Chapter 3. Fig. 1.1 illustrates the structure 
of an optimization problem specifying its components. 
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Fig. 1.1 Optimization problem 
In multiple optimization problems, the strategic firms such as WGenCos, EV 
aggregators, and other players as price-maker submit supply-offers/demand-bids 
to the MO to participate in the electricity market.  
A bilevel (hierarchical) model is used in this dissertation to model the 
behaviour of each player [90-94]. A bilevel problem includes an upper-level 
problem and a set of lower-level problems which are limited by the upper and 
lower equality and inequality constraints. The bilevel model can be formulated as 
a single-level stochastic mathematical program with equilibrium constraints 
(MPEC) [96]. The lower-level problems are continuous linear and they can be 
replaced by their Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions (KKTs) as shown in Fig. 1.2 
[91]. 
As explained in Chapters 4 and 5, the firm’s profit maximization is developed 
as an upper-level problem, and lower-levels problems represent the market 
clearing. The MPEC problem is converted into an MILP problem using branch-
and-cut algorithms [93].  
Multiple MPEC problems constitute an equilibrium problem with equilibrium 
constraints (EPEC) which are solved through the solutions associated with the 
strong stationarity conditions (KKTs) of all MPECs as illustrated in Fig. 1.3 [91].  
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Fig. 1.3 An Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) 
1.4 Project Objectives 
This thesis focuses on revaluating the electricity market associated with the new 
players such as the EV load aggregator, and analysing the impact of coordination 
strategy on the market outcomes and prices. The coordination occurs between the 
EV load aggregator and generating companies through V2G technology.  
In this document, we investigate the two studies as follows: 
 Development of a power exchange between the EV load aggregators and 
WGenCos considered as price-takers in the energy and ancillary service 
markets. 
 Development of a power exchange between the EV load aggregators and 
all generating companies considered as price-makers in the single and 
multiple firms. 
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1.5 Thesis Organization  
The dissertation’s organization is as follows: 
Chapter 1 provides an introduction consisting of preface, the literature 
review, the modelling assumptions, the mathematical structures of electricity 
markets, and the thesis organization and objectives. 
Chapter 2 provides a review of EVs in electricity markets. Firstly, divers 
electricity markets and their time framework are explained. The role of demand 
dispatch in regulation ancillary services is explained. Finally, the role of the EV 
aggregator in regulation ancillary service and energy markets and their 
mathematical formulation are represented. 
Chapter 3 presents an approach to energy exchange between electric 
vehicle (EV) load and wind generation utilities participating in the day-ahead 
energy, balancing, and regulation markets. An optimal bidding/offering strategy 
model is developed to mitigate wind energy and EV imbalance threats, and 
optimize EV charging profiles. A new strategy model is based on optimizing 
decision making of a WGenCo in selecting the best option among the use of the 
balancing or regulation services, the use of the energy storage system (ESS) and 
the use of all of them to compensate wind power deviation. Energy imbalance is 
discussed using conventional systems, ESS, and EV-Wind coordination; results 
are compared and analysed. Stochastic intra-hour optimization is solved by 
MILP. Uncertainties associated with wind forecasting, energy price, and behavior 
of EV owners based on their driving patterns, are considered in the proposed 
stochastic method, and validated through several case studies. 
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Chapter 4 proposes an approach to investigate the impact of merging EV 
load aggregators into the portfolio of a strategic firm, and the influence of this 
strategy on electricity market equilibrium and EV tariff for the sake of increasing 
a firm’s profit while retaining social welfare and optimizing EV charging profiles. 
A strategic firm trades electric energy in an electricity pool including the day-
ahead (DA) and real-time (RT) markets at wholesale-level while EV owners 
connect to an EV aggregator in order to take part in the market at EV-level. A 
stochastic intra-hour bilevel model is developed, which includes a) the firm’s 
profit maximization as an upper-level problem and b) DA and RT social welfare, 
and the EV owner battery energy maximizations with the corresponding 
endogenous price formation as the lower-level problems. The problem is 
formulated from an MPEC to a MILP. Uncertainties of wind speed, and behavior 
of EV owners based on their driving patterns are considered in the proposed 
strategy, and validated through several case studies.  
Chapter 5 proposes a methodology to describe market equilibria in a pool-
based electricity market, where each CGenCo, WGenCo and EV aggregator is 
defined in multiple strategic firms. A bilevel model for each strategic firm is 
developed including expected payoff as upper-level problem, and several lower-
level problems represent the market clearing. Each bilevel model is converted into 
a single-level MPEC by replacing the lower-level problems with their primal-dual 
optimality conditions. An EPEC is formulated to consider all single firms’ 
MPECs. The optimality conditions of the EPEC are derived by replacing each 
MPEC with its KKT conditions. The optimality conditions of the EPEC are 
linearized by formulating and solving an MILP problem. A case study is discussed 
to validate the proposed model to recognize meaningful market equilibria, where 
the strategic CGenCo, WGenCo and EV aggregator participate in energy and 
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ancillary services. We compare different cases including coordination and 
incoordination strategies, with and without EVs, the impact of different EV 
numbers, and different combination of units in multiple firms.  
Chapter 6 concludes this thesis, providing the major contributions of the 
thesis and suggests some directions for future work targeting to develop the 
research studies presented here.  
Appendix A provides mathematical background and details regarding the 
scenario generation and reduction techniques for simulating wind speed, energy 
price, and the number of EVs engaged.  
Appendix B provides the mathematical background of formulating 
absolute values of variables as a MILP. 
Appendix C contains additional data from Chapter 5 which are not 
directly relevant to the discussions of Chapter 5, but they represent additional 
details and complements. 
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Chapter 2   
Electric Vehicles in Electricity Markets 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of EVs in electricity markets. The concept of 
V2G and the role of EV aggregators in regulation ancillary service and energy 
markets and their mathematical formulation are represented. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a general 
description of the different electricity markets and their time framework, and the 
roles of the market players. Section 2.3 provides some insight into the uncertainty 
in power systems. Section 2.4 explains the demand dispatch in regulation 
ancillary services. Section 2.5 explains further the concept of unidirectional and 
bidirectional V2G and EV aggregators. Finally, Sections 2.6 and 2.7 present the 
regulation ancillary services via unidirectional V2G and their mathematical 
formulation in electricity market. 
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2.2 Electricity Markets 
Electricity markets are multi-commodity markets. The different energies 
(products) and services are traded in the different power marketplaces. The 
products include the base energy, reserves, regulation, and balancing energy 
which are altered in control method, response time, duration of the power 
dispatch, contract terms, and price [71]. These energy and services are traded in 
the marketplaces such as pool, reserve and regulation, bilateral, and future 
markets [39]. In this dissertation, the participants in the electricity markets are 
load-side entities (LSE), CGenCos, load aggregators, and WGenCos described as 
follows. 
1. The LSE: provide the electrical demand and energy requirements to the end-
use customers that cannot participate directly in the electricity markets. 
2. CGenCos: supply and sell the electricity energy generated by fossil fuels or 
nuclear energy in the electricity market. Dispatchable CGenCos (such as 
natural gas and coal plants) may participate in the reserve and regulation 
markets to provide reserve power and load following capacity, respectively. 
3. Load Aggregator:  purchases the electricity to supply energy to sizable 
special clients (such as EV owners) through bilateral contracts in the futures 
market. The clients connect to the load aggregator in order to take part in 
the market indirectly. The Load aggregator determines its energy capacity 
and tariff for customers based on achieved market data. 
4. WGenCos: are non-dispatchable producers generating electricity energy by 
wind power. A WGenCo must participate in the balancing market to 
compensate its deviations from the scheduled generation because of inherent 
intermittency of wind energy. 
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2.2.1 Pool-based Electricity Market 
A pool-based electricity market typically includes the day-ahead market and real-
time (balancing) market trading on a short-term basis [57]. 
In the day-ahead market, producers and consumers submit respectively supply-
offers and demand-bids to the MO to participate in the electricity market. The 
MO runs the day-ahead market clearing process to determine day-ahead price and 
energy quantities schedules [65].  
In the real-time market, producers and consumers submit balancing offers to 
the MO to participate in the electricity market. The balancing (real-time) market 
is cleared based on achieved day-ahead market data to balance the excess and 
deficit of production and consumption. Fig. 2.1 shows the structure of a pool-
based electricity market [57]. 
 
Fig. 2.1 The structure of a pool-based electricity market  
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The time framework for the day-ahead market is the whole day (d), which is 
cleared at 10 AM of the day (d-1). The balancing market ensures the real-time 
balance between generation and demand by offsetting the difference between the 
real-time operation and the last energy program cleared in the market. For this 
reason, this market remains open until 10 minutes before the delivery hour [65].  
2.2.2 Reserve and Regulation Markets 
The reserve is an important product to ensure the secure system operation and 
energy delivery in the huge fluctuations of the intermittent energy generation and 
demand. The reserve market supplies standby power (spinning and non-spinning) 
which is cleared in the day-ahead market [39,57]. 
The regulation market provides up and down real-time regulation capacities to 
match generation and load demand (load-following). The amount of regulation 
capacity contracted is the total amount by which power can deviate from a 
baseline level [39,57]. The baseline is often called the preferred operating point 
(POP) [6]. It represents the average level of operation for a market participant 
providing regulation services [9].  
Participants submit supply-offers for regulation capacity (or POP) to the 
market operator which is cleared in the day-ahead market. In the real time 
market, the power generation capacities might be increased or decreased from a 
baseline level called “regulation up” and “regulation down”, respectively [53].  
The regulation up and down are never provided at the same time, although a 
producer can contract to provide one of them or both over the same contract 
period [57]. 
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2.2.3 The Futures Market and Bilateral Contracts 
The futures market is an auction market in which participants buy and sell 
physical or financial products to trade on a medium- or long-term horizon [57].  
A bilateral contract is a free agreement arranged outside an organized 
marketplace between a generating company (GenCo) and a load aggregator, or a 
load aggregator and some customer (such as EVs) shown in Fig. 2.2.  
Fig. 2.3 shows the clearing times of future, day-ahead, reserve, regulation, and 
balancing (real-time) markets. 
 
Fig. 2.2 Bilateral contracting of electricity 
  
2.3 Uncertainty in the Power Grid 
To maintain network frequency as close to the nominal value (50 or 60 Hz) as 
possible, a real-time balance of generation and load have to be operated. Any 
deviation between load and generation is compensated by adding or subtracting 
power. In other words, generation is controlled to follow load [39].  
With high penetration of renewable generation such as solar and wind energy, 
the load-following strategy faces new challenges. Wind and solar energy 
generation are highly unpredictable and quickly changeable. The more 
conventional generation capacities (such as coal and natural gas plants) are 
required to provide the ancillary services and fast ramping for the load-following 
with increases in intermittent renewable energy sources [6].  
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A approach is introduced as a direct control of some loads [6]. Turning a load 
on/off or increasing/decreasing the demand can be effective to balance power in 
the grid. Therefore, without adding new dispatchable generation capacity, we can 
compensate the imbalanced energy in the network via the dispatchable loads 
under demand dispatch [9]. 
2.4 Demand Dispatch 
Demand dispatch (DD) is, in some sense, similar to demand response (DR) with 
the main difference that DR is used only to shed loads at peak times, while DD is 
intended to be used actively at all times [6]. Demand dispatch is a generalization 
of the term DR.  
The application of DD could provide regulation ancillary services to balance 
load and generation on the grid in the different time scale from hours to seconds. 
However, conventional generators can ramp up and down for load-following 
strategy. Conventional generators respond slowly and need to deal with higher 
emissions, lower efficiency, and limited ramp rates. Energy storage such as 
flywheel and batteries could be used for regulation ancillary services, but they 
cause high cost and complexity on the power system [6,43,53]. 
Some kinds of load called dispatchable loads turn on/off repeatedly and 
become generation-following under DD. Turning some loads on/off such as lights 
would cause discomfort for the electricity consumer. However, remotely controlled 
loads are unnoticeable such as electric hot water heaters, dishwashers, washers, 
dryers and charging an electric vehicle at night.  
The criteria of a dispatchable load are [6]:  
1) predictable to be forecasted for next day, 
2) switchable to turn on/off frequently, 
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3) flexible to draw power in the specific time and energy amount. 
According to the criteria mentioned above, one of the best candidates for demand 
dispatch would be electric vehicle loads through unidirectional V2G technology 
[8,41]. 
2.5 Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) 
The concept of V2G is that EVs connect to the grid while parked. V2G 
application can be both unidirectional and bidirectional. In bidirectional V2G, 
EVs charge from the grid during low load periods and discharge to the grid when 
power is low [43]. In unidirectional V2G, the EV battery is considered as a 
dispatchable load to balance energy in the grid. V2G is expected to be 
implemented first as it requires less infrastructure and reduces the battery 
degradation by not requiring additional cycling for bidirectional power flow [9]. 
V2G requires a connection system to the grid, communication system, and 
control and metering systems. The control signals can be transmitted through a 
cell phone and Internet networks [39].  
The battery of an individual EV is too small to affect the grid. An EV 
aggregator including large numbers of EVs acts as an intermediary between 
individual EVs and the MO. EVs can connect to a third-party aggregator 
individually or as a fleet operator (a parking lot) within a city or whole area [43]. 
An EV aggregator can decrease the volume of communication signals to the MO. 
Therefore, the EV aggregators can reduce the market operator complexity and 
improve the cyber-security [11]. 
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2.6 Regulation Ancillary Services via Unidirectional V2G 
The EVs, when aggregated in a sizeable number, can play an important role in 
regulation service due to much faster ramping capability than gas turbines 
through V2G technology [6,41,42].  
The EV aggregator participates as dispatchable load in the energy and 
ancillary service markets by submitting energy bids and regulation offers. POP 
represents the average level of operation for a market participant providing 
regulation services. It is assumed that the EV aggregator can deviate from the 
day-ahead power-drawn (or POP) to amend imbalance energy by reducing or 
increasing their charging rate with consideration of EV aggregator energy 
constraints [6,53].  
Fig. 2.4 illustrates EV aggregator regulating while POP value is determined for 
one hour in the day-ahead market and regulation-up or -down dispatch deviates 
from POP following generation in the real-time market. Regulation-down and 
regulation-up dispatches represent increasing and decreasing the EV load demand, 
respectively. 
2.7 Mathematical Formulation of Unidirectional V2G in the 
Electricity Market 
A stochastic objective function (2.1) is to maximize the profits of the EV 
aggregator. According to the method discussed above, the EV aggregator’s 
revenue is obtained by selling ancillary services, as well as selling energy to its 
clients at the tariff ( ). The aggregator encourages EV owners to join in by 
offering an attractive price for charging in comparison with petrol and energy 
prices.  
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Fig. 2.4 EV aggregator regulating; the shaded area highlights the energy drawn 
from the grid   
The EV aggregator’s cost is associated with buying energy at the day-ahead 
market price ( ) for regulation capacity (or POP). In this strategy, the power 
deviation between day-ahead and real-time markets is compensated by regulating 
the charging power down ( ) or up ( ) of POP at the real-time market 
price ( ). Hence, the EV aggregator’s payoff is represented as: 
 
 
(2.1)  
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Constraints for the EV’s POP, capacity to increase the charging rate for 
regulation down ( ), capacity to decrease the charging rate for regulation up 
( ) are given in (2.2)-(2.6).  
  (2.2) 
 (2.3) 
(2.4) 
(2.5) 
(2.6) 
Since the regulation up and down are never provided at the same time, the 
status of regulation down or up is determined in (2.7).  
 (2.7) 
The energy balance equation for the EV aggregator is given in (2.8). The EV 
energy capacity in each intra-hour ( ) is the EV energy capacity in prior 
intra-hour ( ) plus energy charged by drawing power from the grid 
( ) minus energy consumed by EVs while driving. The regulation 
capacity of the EV aggregator increases when the numbers of charging EVs 
increase and, vice versa as given in (2.8).  
 (2.8) 
The energy capacity of EV aggregator is constrained in (2.9). 
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(2.9) 
The constraint (2.10) imposes limits at the beginning and at the end of each 
interval of the energy capacity of the EV aggregator.  
 (2.10) 
The constraint (2.11) specifies the level of State of Charge (SOC) to be reached 
by time (T) for a specified EV client. This constraint is an option for clients to 
set up the desirable SOC for their EVs at the time of expected commuting (T).  
 (2.11) 
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Chapter 3  
Energy Exchange between Electric 
Vehicle Load and Wind Generating 
Utilities  
3.1 Introduction 
An electricity market, e.g. PJM, may have a two-settlement system consisting of 
two markets: a day-ahead market (DAM) and a real-time balancing market. 
Generators are paid for any generation that exceeds their day‐ahead scheduled 
quantities and are penalized for generation deviations below their scheduled 
quantities [6]. Whenever the scheduled day-ahead wind power generation deviates 
from the real–time market (RTM), the profitability of WGenCos decreases due to 
imbalance energy charges for the wind units [6, 35].  
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To mitigate potential wind energy imbalance charges for WGenCos, the 
authors in [35], suggested a coordinated scheduling of wind energy units and 
storage units. However, the study was based on pumped storage power systems 
which represent only around 2.2% of the total generation with efficiency at about 
75%; they have high installation costs, and are limited to specific locations [10]. 
Although stored energy increases the economic value of wind energy [8], the use of 
large scale battery-based ESS is currently still prohibitively expensive. 
The imbalanced energy exchange based on a dedicated coordination between 
EV load aggregators and WGenCos can potentially increase the competitiveness 
of WGenCos and EV-load customers in the energy market.  
This chapter develops an optimal bidding/offering strategy for EV load 
demands in coordination with a WGenCo, thereby maximizing the WGenCo’s 
competitiveness, optimizing EV charging profiles and mitigating imbalance energy 
provided by the balancing market. The EV aggregator participates in the energy 
and ancillary service markets while the WGenCo participates in the day-ahead 
energy and balancing markets. 
The main contributions of the chapter are as follows [97-98]: 
 The development of a two-stage stochastic linear programming (SLP)-
based optimal offering/bidding strategy model for the coordinated EV-
Wind units participating in the day-ahead energy, balancing, and 
regulation markets. 
 The development of an SLP-based optimal offering strategy model for 
the ESS-Wind units participating in the day-ahead energy, and 
balancing markets. 
 
 
 
3.2 Market Framework 
 
31 
 
 A new strategy model based on optimal decision making for selecting 
between the balancing, regulation services, and/or using ESS for a 
WGenCo to compensate wind power deviation. 
 Comprehensive comparisons of three different cases comprising 
conventional systems (WGenCo without energy storage), WGenCo with 
ESS, and a coordinated EV-Wind energy exchange for dealing with 
energy imbalance.  
 Consideration of the uncertainties associated with wind forecast, energy 
price, and EV owners’ behaviour based on driving patterns. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the 
market framework for the sake of conventional systems (WGenCo without 
storage), WGenCo with the energy storage system, and a power system with a 
coordinated EV-Wind energy exchange. Section 3.3 presents the mathematical 
model formulations of proposed models. Several case studies are discussed in 
Section 3.4. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes, summarizing the chapter. 
3.2 Market Framework 
The day-ahead market and a real-time balancing market are the two settlement 
systems considered in this chapter. Participants in the DAM submit supply-
offers/demand-bids to the system operator. These participants also submit 
supply-offers for the regulation capacity, and they may later submit revised 
regulation quantities, which are different from day-ahead offer quantities, without 
any penalty imposed [53].  
Wind generation and EV load aggregators participate as price takers in the 
DAM by hourly offering/bidding amounts that are based on the day-ahead 
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forecast while energy and price variations occur within minutes (i.e. intra-hour) 
[35]. 
In this chapter, three different strategies are considered to deal with the energy 
imbalance for a WGenCo participating in short-term electricity markets (DAM 
and balancing). In the subsections below, these strategies are demonstrated using 
conventional systems (WGenCo without storage), WGenCo with the energy 
storage system, and a power system with a coordinated EV-Wind energy 
exchange. 
3.2.1 Conventional Systems 
WGenCos participate in the DAM and balancing market. The imbalance charge 
is imposed on the WGenCo to balance energy in the power system due to 
deviation of the RTM [12, 35]. The WGenCo’s payoff in this method is as follows: 
According to (3.2), the wind energy deviation between day- ahead and real-
time is considered as the energy imbalance: 
3.2.2 WGenCo with the Energy Storage System 
It is assumed that battery storage belongs to the WGenCo participating in the 
DAM and balancing market. The authors in [12] and [35] proposed a scheduling 
strategy for the coordination of wind and storage units without any flexibility for 
the WGenCo to adapt when the storage units fail. 
 
(3.1) 
 (3.2) 
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This section proposes a new scheduling strategy, which considers optimal 
decision making for WGenCos in selecting between the balancing market and ESS 
to compensate for wind power deviations. The WGenCo can decide whether to 
use the ESS or not based on penalties, energy prices, maintenance requirements 
and other factors. According to (3.3), the wind energy deviation between the 
DAM and RTM can be compensated by the battery storage system and balancing 
market. The optimization determines the one which is the most efficient.  
A degradation cost from the battery bank charging/discharging is considered in 
this method. The WGenCo’s payoff is as follows: 
3.2.3 Coordinated EV-Wind Energy Exchange 
In the method discussed above, the WGenCo participates in the short-term 
electricity market. The EV aggregator participates as dispatchable load in the 
energy and ancillary service markets by submitting energy bids and regulation 
offers. The amount of regulation contracted is the total amount by which power 
can deviate from a baseline level. The baseline is often called the POP (Preferred 
operating point) [6]. The term POP itself comes from ancillary services markets. 
It represents the average level of operation for a market participant providing 
regulation services [8]. It is assumed that the EV aggregator can deviate from the 
day-ahead power-drawn (or POP) to amend wind imbalance energy by reducing 
or increasing their charging rate with consideration of EV aggregator energy 
 (3.3) 
(3.4) 
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constraints. Therefore, the offer price in the day-ahead market does not change in 
the real-time market while offer quantities can be revised [17].  
 
Fig. 3.1 Coordination between EV demand and wind power deviation in energy and 
regulation market. 
The penalties are not imposed for revising the day-ahead power drawn offer 
quantities [39]. When real-time wind energy exceeds the forecasted day-ahead 
wind energy, the EV aggregator regulates down with more charging, and vice 
versa (see Fig. 3.1).  
The wind energy deviation between DAM and RTM is compensated by 
structured regulation, which is provided by the EV aggregator, and unstructured 
regulation, which is provided by the balancing market as follows:  
Therefore, the WGenCo can select between regulation and balancing markets 
based on penalties, energy prices, lack of EVs, and other factors. The WGenCo’s 
payoff in coordination with EV aggregators in this part is: 
 (3.5) 
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Real-time power drawn by the EV aggregator is given by: 
Hence, the EV aggregator’s revenue is obtained by selling ancillary services, as 
well as selling energy to its clients at a fixed price ( ). In this chapter, the tariff 
charged to EV clients is assumed to be constant (fixed). The aggregator 
encourages EV owners to join in by offering an attractive price for charging in 
comparison with petrol and energy prices.   
The EV aggregator’s cost is associated with buying energy for EV charging. 
Hence, the EV aggregator’s payoff is represented as: 
3.3 Mathematical Model Formulation 
In this section, the problems of optimal dispatch for three different WGenCo 
scheduling strategies are formulated and presented. These problems are solved as 
a two-stage mixed-integer stochastic program [54]. The first-stage variable is 
decided before stochastic variables with the hourly day-ahead input parameters 
such as . The second-stage variable is dependent on 
 
(3.6) 
 (3.7) 
 
(3.8) 
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scenarios with sub-hourly (intra-hourly) RT input parameters such as 
 
3.3.1 Conventional Systems 
The objective function  
is to maximize the revenue from selling the day-ahead wind energy minus the cost 
of energy imbalance [12], [35]. The intra-hour based wind power deviation 
between real-time and day-ahead schedules is  
and generation limits are given in  
The following equations are a linear representation of the absolute value of 
variable  for the MILP formulation [12]: 
 
(3.9) 
 (3.10) 
(3.11) 
(3.12) 
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In (3.15), M is the upper bound of , and in (3.16), M is the 
upper bound of . These equations are proved in Appendix C. 
3.3.2 WGenCo with the Energy Storage System 
The objective function  
  
 
(3.17) 
is to maximize the revenue from selling the day-ahead wind energy minus the cost 
of energy imbalance and battery charging/discharging costs [39]. The intra-hour-
based wind power deviation between real-time and day-ahead schedule is given in  
(3.13) 
(3.14) 
(3.15) 
(3.16) 
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The wind power deviation has two terms including imbalance, and battery 
charging/discharging energy.  The following equations are a linear form of the 
absolute value of variable  for MILP formulation:  
where M is a large positive number [12]. Battery charging/discharging and 
imbalance power constraints are in  
Constraints presented in (3.11)-(3.16) are used as well.  
The charging/discharging cost depends directly on the depth of discharge 
(DoD) and the number of cycles to failure of the battery [39]. As the depth of 
aggregated battery discharge increases, the number of cycles to failure decreases. 
 (3.18) 
(3.19) 
(3.20) 
(3.21) 
(3.22) 
(3.23) 
(3.24) 
(3.25) 
(3.26) 
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The piecewise linear representation of the concave discharge cost curve of EV 
batteries in the proposed MIP formulation is shown in  
3.3.3 Coordinated EV-Wind Energy Exchange 
The objective function  
is to maximize the profits of the EV aggregator and the WGenCo according to 
(3.6) and (3.8). In this strategy, the wind power deviation between DAM and 
RTM is compensated by regulating the down/up charging power of the EV 
(3.27) 
(3.28) 
 
(3.29)   
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aggregator ( ) and by the energy imbalance ( ) provided by the 
grid, as given by 
The energy balance equation for the EV aggregator is given in  
The EV energy capacity in each intra-hour ( ) is the EV energy capacity 
in the prior intra-hour ( ) plus energy charged by drawing power from the 
grid ( ) minus energy consumed by EVs while driving. The regulation 
capacity of the EV aggregator increases when the numbers of charging EVs 
increase and, vice versa as given in (3.31).  
Constraints presented in (3.11)-(3.16) and (3.19)-(3.23) are also used here. 
Constraints for the EV’s POP, capacity to increase the charging rate for 
regulation down ( ), capacity to decrease the charging rate for regulation up 
( ) are given in 
  (3.32) 
 (3.33) 
(3.34) 
(3.35) 
 (3.30) 
 (3.31) 
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(3.36) 
In  
the status of regulation down or up is determined. The EV energy constraint is 
presented in  
The constraint  
imposes limits at the beginning and at the end of each interval of the energy 
capacity of the EV aggregator. The constraint  
specifies the level of SOC to be reached by time (T) for a specified EV client. 
This constraint is an option for clients to set up the desirable SOC for their EVs 
at the time of expected commuting (T). For example, the EV client wants to 
have the battery fully charged (i.e., 100% SOC) by the departure time (for 
example, 5:00pm) to go back home. 
 
 
 (3.37) 
 
 
(3.38) 
 (3.39) 
 (3.40) 
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3.4 Case Studies and Numerical Results 
To test the proposed model, a WGenCo with a single wind farm is assumed to 
participate in a day-ahead energy market. The capacity of the wind farm is 200 
MW, which is a relatively small farm compared to the wholesale energy market.  
The WGenCo is a price-taker; it is not a dominant player in the wholesale energy 
market. 10,000 scenarios are reduced to just ten using scenario reduction 
techniques presented in [69]. Fig. 3.2 shows the intra-hourly wind power 
generation forecasted for these ten scenarios. Fig. 3.3 shows the day-ahead energy 
price, regulation up/down prices, and intra-hour real time energy price scenarios. 
Fig. 3.4 shows the intra-hourly EV penetration forecasted for the same ten 
scenarios. We consider the worst conditions to occur when peak demand and high 
regulation prices coincide with the lowest penetration of EVs (see Figs. 3.3—3.4. 
The number of intra-hour intervals is 6 (10 min each). 
The maximum EV charging power is assumed to be 7.3 kW, and the energy 
capacity of each EV is 27.4 kWh. Average annual driving distance of an EV is 
assumed 20,000 km with an average daily distance of 52.91 km. The required 
energy for an EV is 9 kWh/day with an average of 5.87 km/kWh [35], [39], [43]. 
In this chapter, the fixed charging tariff is assumed to be $0.01/kWh [12]. We 
assume that the required energy for driving in one direction is the same as that of 
returning to the starting point. For the EV aggregator, we consider two EV 
penetration scenarios 1,000 and 10,000 EVs. The cycle efficiency is 83.6% for a 
charging/discharging efficiency of 95% [35, 65]. The EV fleet has its own 
commute time based on the region, city, traffic patterns, etc.  The number of EV 
fleets is assumed to be one with commute intervals between 7 A.M and 9 A.M, and 
between 5 P.M. and 8 P.M. However, the equations provided in the chapter are  
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general and can be used for any number of EV fleets. In this chapter, 100% SOC 
is considered for departure times to represent the worst case scenario. 
The capacity of a battery bank of the ESS is assumed to be similar to the 
capacity of 10,000 EVs. The current price of a complete battery pack is 
$600/kWh. 
 
Fig. 3.2 The intra-hourly wind power generation forecasted for ten scenarios. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.3 The day-ahead energy price, regulation up/down prices, and intra-hour real time 
energy price scenarios. 
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Fig. 3.4 The intra-hourly EV penetration forecasted for ten scenarios. 
 
Four cases are considered for the investigation of two important issues: the 
payoff, and generation and demand dispatch. The four cases are defined as 
follows: 
 Case A—Conventional systems: The WGenCo without ESS 
participates in the energy market. 
 Case B—ESS-wind: The WGenCo with ESS participates in the 
energy market. 
 Case C—1K-EV-Wind: The WGenCo in coordination with 1,000 
EVs participates in the energy and regulation markets. 
 Case D—10K-EV-Wind: The WGenCo in coordination with 10,000 
EVs participates in the energy and regulation markets. 
 
3.4.1 Payoff Analysis 
Table 3.1 shows the total WGenCo’s payoffs for all cases when the penalty price 
is $30/MWh. The total payoff for Case D is $79,888.98, while the expected 
payoffs in cases A and B are $77,023.94 and $77,064.63, respectively. The 
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difference between the two payoffs in case D and case A is $2,869.04 (3.72%), 
while the difference between the two payoffs in Case B and Case A is just $40.69 
(0.05%). It is clear that using the battery storage at a penalty price of $30/MWh 
is not affordable. The EV penetration impact on the payoffs is obvious when 
comparing cases C and D. Table 3.1 shows that the payoff in Case D exceeds that 
of Case C by 1.86%. 
Table 3.1  
WGenCo’s Payoffs In Different Cases at the $30 Penalty Price 
Cases Case A Case B Case C Case D 
DA Energy Sale Revenue ($) 81132.56 81177.86 83395.12 99763.90 
DA Revenue Adjustment ($) -875.06 -702.45 -2307.46 -17520 
Imbalance Charge ($) -3233.56 -3071.77 -2491.57 -589.20 
Regulation Cost ($) - - -195.60 -1620.61 
Discharging Cost ($) - -339.01 - - 
Payoff ($) 77023.94 77064.63 78400.48 79888.98 
 
Tables 3.2—3.5 and Figs. 3.5—3.7 show the impact of the penalty price on the 
WGenCo’s payoffs for different cases. It is clear that with the increasing penalty 
price, the day-ahead energy sale revenue and the total payoff decrease with more 
conservative day-ahead generation offers. However, with the EV-wind 
coordination, the total payoff with respect to the penalty price remains almost 
constant (see Fig.  3.5). For example, while penalty price changes from $10/MWh 
to $150/MWh, the total payoff in cases D, C, B, and A decreases by 2.21%, 
7.42%, 8.02% and 10.01%, respectively. It is clear that the total payoff under 
variable penalty price is more sustainable (stable) with the 10K-EV-Wind 
coordination (see Fig.  3.5). 
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Comparing results presented in Tables 3.2—3.4 shows that the difference 
between the two payoffs in Case D and Case A at the penalty price of $10/MWh 
is $384 (0.4%), while this difference is $6683 (8.4%) at the penalty price of 
$150/MWh. Therefore, the effectiveness of coordinating EVs with wind generation 
becomes more apparent for penalty prices greater than $20/MWh (see Fig. 3.5). 
Comparing Case B with cases C and A shows that the total payoff in Case B is 
greater than in Case A for penalty prices greater than $40/MWh. The total 
payoff in Case B is lower than in Case C although they get closer with higher 
penalty prices (see Fig. 3.5), since the battery discharging cost is more affordable 
under higher penalty prices.  
Comparing cases D and C shows that the appropriate capacity of the EV 
aggregator is an important factor in coordinating the EVs and WGenCos. 
Benefits of the use of EV aggregators of sufficient capacity include higher total 
payoffs, lower imbalance charges and less conservative day-ahead generation 
offers. However,  a smaller number of EVs offer better results in comparison with 
cases A and B. 
Fig. 3.6 shows imbalance charges provided by the balancing market versus 
penalty prices. It is clear that the imbalance charge in Case D is less than in the 
other cases. Fig. 3.7 demonstrates that an increase in penalty price decreases the 
EV regulation cost for the WGenCO (or the EV regulation profitability for the 
EV aggregator) when wind deviations decrease, thus the EV regulation 
contribution is lower. The battery charging/discharging cost for Case B would 
increase with the increase in the penalty price, because imbalance charges 
imposed by the balancing market are more expensive than the battery 
charging/discharging cost under higher penalty prices; thus the ESS contribution 
is higher. 
 
 
 
 
3.4 Case Studies and Numerical Results 
47 
 
 
 
Table 3.2  
Impact of the Penalty Price on WGenCo’s Payoffs In Case A 
Penalty Price ($/MWh) 10 50 100 150 
DA Energy Sale Revenue ($) 78966.02 79304.49 76935.06 75953.17 
DA Revenue Adjustment ($) 4853.88 -1375.28 -720.16 -545.94 
Imbalance Charge ($) -3136.93 -2332.88 -2411.29 -2745.66 
Payoff ($) 80682.97 75596.32 73803.61 72661.56 
 
Table 3.3  
Impact of the Penalty Price on WGenCo’s Payoffs In Case B 
Penalty Price ($/MWh) 10 50 100 150 
DA Energy Sale Revenue ($) 78721.16 79605.04 79097.86 77505.53 
DA Revenue Adjustment ($) 4046.73 -1018.64 -272.77 -149.45 
Imbalance Charge ($) -2330.48 -1763.76 -939.59 -920.54 
Discharging Cost ($) -1.49 -987.91 -3272.19 -2254.82 
Payoff ($) 80435.92 75834.72 75907.64 74329.83 
 
Table 3.4  
Impact of the Penalty Price on WGenCo’s Payoffs In Case D 
Penalty Price ($/MWh) 10 50 100 150 
DA Energy Sale Revenue ($) 103290.28 98285.83 96980.28 96154.44 
DA Revenue Adjustment ($) -21730 -16370 -15380 -14760 
Imbalance Charge ($) -492.93 -492.99 -486.48 -560.03 
Regulation Cost ($) -2339.87 -1650.21 -1543.62 -1489.86 
Payoff ($) 81067.35 79775.13 79568.18 79344.94 
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Fig. 3.5 The WGenCo’s payoff versus penalty prices. 
 
Fig. 3.6 Imbalance charges provided by balancing market versus penalty prices 
 
Fig. 3.7 EV regulation and battery discharging cost versus penalty prices. 
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3.4.2 Demand and Generation Dispatch analysis 
Wind power generation and EV load demand dispatch in Case D at penalty 
prices of $10/MWh and $150/MWh are shown in Figs.  3.8—3.9, respectively. 
These figures show day-ahead wind  power (Pw-DA), real-time wind power (Pw-
RT), wind power deviation ( , day-ahead EV charging schedule (POP-DA), 
EV regulation up/down, and energy imbalance provided by the balancing market 
( ). Figs. 3.10 and 3.11 show wind power generation and battery bank 
dispatch in Case B at penalty prices of $10MWh and $150/MWh, respectively. 
It can be seen that the Pw-RT schedules in Figs. 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 look very 
similar, but the schedule in Fig. 3.11 differs noticeably. This demonstrates that 
the penalty price increase has a greater impact in Case B than in Case D. For 
instance, in Table 3.5, the total Pw-RT per day in cases B and D are 2,977 MWh, 
and 3,111 MWh, respectively, at the penalty price of $150/MWh. However, the 
total Pw-RT per day in cases B and D are the same for the $10/MWh penalty 
price. This demonstrates that the effectiveness of the coordinated EV-wind energy 
exchange becomes more apparent when penalty prices are higher. From Table 3.5, 
it can also be observed that the total Pw-RT in Case D remains almost 
unchanged irrespective of the penalty price. 
If we now compare the total  per day for all cases under the $10/MWh 
penalty price, we find that this parameter is much higher in Case D (this can be 
attributed to the less conservative day-ahead generation offers). We can also find 
that the total  per day under any penalty price is smaller in Case D than in 
all other cases (this fact is particularly apparent under the $10/MWh penalty 
price). 
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Results presented in Figs. 3.8, 3.9 and Table 3.5 also demonstrate that the 
increase in the penalty price decreases the total up/down EV regulation 
contributions – the total up/down EV regulation at $10/MWh and $150/MWh 
penalty prices are 761.9 MWh and 584.1 MWh, respectively. 
Results presented in Figs. 3.10, 3.11 and Table 3.5 show that the increase in 
penalty price leads to higher battery charging/discharging costs (Case B). The 
total charging/discharging costs at penalty prices of $10/MWh and $150/MWh 
are 4.7 MWh and 69.8 MWh, respectively. Battery discharge power increases 
under the higher penalty prices, because the battery charging/discharging cost is 
more affordable than imbalance charges imposed by the balancing market under 
higher penalty prices. 
Table 3.5  
Total Real-Time Wind Power Generation,  
Wind Power Deviation and Energy Imbalance per Day 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total (MWh) Penalty Price Case A Case B Case C Case D 
Pw-RT 
10 ($/MWh) 
3138 3138 3138 3137 
 313.69 216.56 325.12 811.24 
 313.69 211.86 255.42 49.29 
Pw-RT 
100 ($/MWh) 
2896 2990 2976 3116 
 24.11 79.16 60.58 609.2 
 24.11 9.39 20.74 4.86 
Pw-RT 
150 ($/MWh) 
2867 2977 2949 3111 
 18.30 73.59 46.1 588.8 
18.30 4.317 15.167 3.733 
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Fig. 3.8 Wind power generation and EV demand schedule in Case D under the $10/MWh 
penalty price. 
 
 
Fig. 3.9 Wind power generation and EV demand schedule in Case D under the 
$150/MWh penalty price. 
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Fig. 3.10 Wind power deviation and battery energy storage profile in case B at 10 
$/MWh penalty price 
 
Fig. 3.11 Wind power generation schedule and battery energy storage profile in case B at 
150 $/MWh penalty price 
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3.5 Summary 
Effective coordination between a WGenCo participating in the short-term 
electricity market and an EV aggregator participating in the energy and ancillary 
service markets increases the WGenCo’s competitiveness and mitigates wind and 
EV energy imbalance threats. This chapter has introduced a stochastic optimal 
scheduling strategy. The strategy has been demonstrated on conventional systems 
(WGenCo without storage), WGenCo with ESS, and a power system with a 
coordinated EV-Wind energy exchange. The proposed strategy has been 
developed using model based-optimal decision making. It offers flexibility in 
selecting between the balancing, regulation services, and/or ESS for a WGenCo to 
compensate for wind power deviations. Comparisons of the coordinated EV-Wind 
energy exchange with the other two cases reveal that 
 the coordinated EV-wind energy exchange ensures that the WGenCo 
payoff remains constant under changing penalty prices; 
 the effectiveness of the coordinated EV-wind energy exchange becomes 
more apparent under higher penalty prices; 
 benefits offered by EV aggregators of sufficient capacity include higher 
total payoffs, lower imbalance charges and less conservative day-ahead 
generation offers. However, a smaller number of EVs offer better 
results in comparison with the other two cases; 
 the total energy imbalance adjusted by the balancing market decreases 
extremely under the coordinated EV-wind energy exchange. 
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Chapter 4  
Pool Strategy of a Single Firm in 
Coordination with EV Load Aggregators  
4.1 Introduction 
It is vital for a firm (a producer including CGenCos and WGenCos) and the 
market operator to review equilibrium analysis to investigate new players 
influenced in the future smart grid [13, 56]. The WGenCos participate in 
electricity markets despite their uncertainty to maximize the expected payoff, 
similar to the other market producers with consideration of WGenCo as price-
maker market player [11]. Also, some new market players (e.g. EV aggregators) 
have to compete with other market players while motivating the consumers to 
take part in the market [11-13].  
However, the highest benefits for EV load aggregators are expected through 
participation in ancillary services [39]. The EV load aggregator meets to challenge 
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of considering both minimum tariff to motivate EV owners to take part in the 
market and high probability to be competitive on its own. Therefore, the 
determination of an optimal charging tariff is necessary to maximize the 
aggregator’s profit and keep the current EV owners and attract new customers. 
The EV charging tariff can affect prices and the market outcomes.  
This chapter investigates EV aggregator as price maker which is in the 
generation portfolio of a strategic producer including WGenCo and CGenCos. 
The main contributions of the chapter are:  
• The development of an optimal bidding/offering strategy for the EV load 
aggregator providing the energy and ancillary services in coordination with a 
strategic producer in a pool-based electricity market with endogenous 
formation of DA and RT prices, and EV aggregator tariff.  
• Optimization of EV charging profile with consideration of both endogenous 
fixed-rate and Time of Use (ToU) tariffs.  
• The proposed formulation of a stochastic intra-hour bilevel optimization 
problem given by an MPEC including an upper-level problem and three 
lower-level problems for the sake of a) the strategic firm’s profit 
maximization, and b) DA and RT social welfare, and EV owner’s battery 
energy maximization, respectively.  
• The analysis of the impact of EV numbers, both fixed-rate and ToU tariff 
on the price and market outcome.  
• Consideration of the uncertainties related to wind speed, and EV owners’ 
behavior based on driving patterns.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the market 
framework. Section 4.3 provides a mathematical model formulation. Test of the 
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proposed market model through case studies is described in Section 4.4. Finally, 
Section 4.5 concludes, summarizing the chapter. 
4.2 Proposed Market Framework  
Two levels of market framework are introduced in this thesis which are wholesale-
level and EV-level shown in Fig. 4.1. At the wholesale-level, a strategic firm 
including CGenCos, WGenCos, and EV aggregators submits supply-
offers/demand-bids to the MO to participate in the day-ahead and real-time 
market directly. The MO runs the day-ahead market clearing process to 
determine day-ahead price, and power production schedules of CGenCos, 
WGenCos, LSEs and EVs. Also, the real-time market is cleared for each scenario 
based on achieved day-ahead data to determine real-time prices, regulation 
capacities, and wind power and load curtailments. 
At the EV-level, EV owners connect to the EV aggregator in order to take part 
in the market indirectly. The EV aggregator determines maximum EV energy 
capacity and optimal charging tariff based on achieved day-ahead and real-time 
data.  
The model assumptions are as follows:  
1. The EV aggregator participates as dispatchable loads in the market by 
submitting strategic bid and offer prices to the day-ahead and the real-
time markets, respectively at the wholesale-level. At the EV-level, EV 
owners connect to the EV aggregator to participate in the market for 
increasing the negotiation power of EV customers. Therefore, each EV 
fleet or owner is assigned to an EV aggregator through a contract [11]. 
The EV charging energy, charging tariff, and up and down regulation 
directly affect the strategic producer’s expected profit. The amount of 
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regulation contracted is the total amount by which power can deviate 
from a baseline level (or POP). It is assumed that the EV aggregator can 
deviate from the day-ahead power-drawn (or POP) to balance energy by 
reducing or increasing their charging rate with consideration of EV 
aggregator energy constraints [6].  
2. WGenCo submits strategic offer prices to the day-ahead and the real-time 
markets. Moreover, the wind power production excess/shortage, and 
curtailment power influence the strategic producer’s expected profit [13].  
3. CGenCo participates as dispatchable units in the market by submitting 
strategic offer prices to the day-ahead and the real-time markets, 
respectively. The energy production cost functions are assumed to be 
linear [99].  
4. The LSEs submit bid prices for energy and curtailment (to be elastic) to 
the day-ahead and real market but not strategically [13, 65,93].  
5. A transmission network is neglected for simplicity.  
6. The price scheme used is the same as the scheme presented in [99]. Each 
generating unit is paid for its scheduled power production and EV loads 
are charged for their power consumption in the day-ahead market at the 
price . Additionally, each generating unit and EV aggregator is 
paid/charged for its regulation up/down at the prices  as 
repurchased prices [99]. 
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4.3 Mathematical Model Formulation 
A bilevel (hierarchical) model is used in this chapter to model the behaviour of a 
strategic firm. 
4.3.1 Bilevel Model 
A stochastic bilevel model is taken into account where an upper-level problem 
corresponds to a strategic firm’s profit maximization, while the lower-level 
problems correspond to markets clearing for maximization of social welfare as 
shown in Fig. 4.2. The lower-level problems consist of the day-ahead market, real-
time market, and EV energy market clearing which aim to maximize the social 
welfare and are subject to the power balance, and power limits.  
The day-ahead lower level determines the day-ahead price and the power 
production/consumption quantities which directly affect the firm’s expected profit 
in the upper-level problem, and EV energy and real-time market clearing in the 
lower-level problems. The real-time lower level presents the clearing of the real-
time market based on EV numbers and wind power production scenarios which 
directly affect the firm’s expected profit in the upper-level problem, and EV 
energy market in the lower-level problems. The EV energy lower level determines 
optimal charging tariff ( ) based on achieved day-ahead and real-time data 
which directly affect the firm’s expected profit in the upper-level problem. The 
strategic offering and decisions made by a strategic firm in the upper-level 
problem influence the market clearing outcomes in the lower-level problems. 
The mathematical formulation of electricity markets is developed based on 
offering/bidding strategies given in [13, 93]. 
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Fig. 4.2 Bilevel structure of the proposed wholesale & EV-levels structure of the 
electricity market. 
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4.3.1.1 Upper Level 
The Objective function of maximizing the expected profits of a strategic firm 
which owns both CGenCos and WGenCos and constitutes unidirectional V2G 
services is as follows [100]: 
 
  (4.1) 
The expected profit of CGenCos is revenue minus cost of generation in the 
day-ahead market, and revenue minus cost of regulation up/down in the real-time 
markets, given by (4.2): 
  
  
(4.2) 
The expected profit of WGenCos is revenue of generation in the day-ahead 
market, and revenue minus cost of excess/shortage generation in the real-time 
markets, given by (4.3): 
  
  
(4.3) 
Finally, the EV aggregator's revenue is obtained by selling ancillary services, as 
well as selling energy to its clients at the tariff ( ). The aggregator encourages 
EV owners to join in by offering an attractive price for charging which is low in 
comparison with petrol and energy prices. The EV aggregator's cost is associated 
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with buying energy for EV charging. Hence, the EV aggregator's payoff is 
represented as: 
  
  
(4.4) 
The primal variables  of the upper-level problem include positive 
offering/bidding variables , , , , ,  and variable sets 
, and . 
4.3.1.2 Day-Ahead Lower Level 
The day-ahead lower-level problem is formulated in this subsection. The day-
ahead market clearing is addressed with the aim of maximization of social welfare 
given by (4.5): 
  
(4.5) 
The primal variables of the lower-level problem (4.5) are those in set , 
and their dual variables in set  where dual variables are indicated following a 
colon at the constraints.  
The energy balance in the day-ahead market is given by:  
           :  
(4.6) 
where dual variable  provides the day-ahead equilibrium price.  
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Constraint for the EV POP is given by: 
(4.7) 
Constraints in (4.8) and (4.9) limit the scheduled power production of 
conventional and wind units, respectively.  
(4.8) 
(4.9) 
The day-ahead scheduled demand is limited in (4.10). 
(4.10) 
4.3.1.3 Real-Time Lower Level 
The real-time lower-level problem represents the real-time market clearing with 
the aim of maximization of social welfare for scenarios s given by (4.11): 
  
(4.11) 
The primal variables of the lower-level problem (4.11) are those in set , 
and their dual variables in set  where dual variables are shown at the 
corresponding constraints following a colon.  
The energy balance in the real-time market is given by:  
  
(4.12) 
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  :  
where dual variable  provides the real-time equilibrium prices.  
The capacity limits for regulation down ( ) to increase the EV charging 
rate, and regulation up ( ) to decrease the EV charging rate are given in 
(4.13)-(4.16). 
(4.13) 
(4.14) 
(4.15) 
(4.16) 
Constraints (4.17) and (4.18) refer to the lower and upper bounds on the up 
and down regulations deployed from each dispatchable unit.  
(4.17) 
(4.18) 
The constraints (4.19) and (4.20) guarantee that the power productions of 
conventional units are less than their capacities.  
(4.19) 
(4.20) 
The constraints (4.21) and (4.22) limit the minimum and maximum for the 
wind power and load demand curtailment. 
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(4.21) 
(4.22) 
4.3.1.4 EV Energy Lower Level 
The EV Energy lower-level problem aims to maximize EV energy capacity given 
in 
(4.23) 
The energy balance equation for the EV fleet is given in  
       : ,  (4.24) 
(4.25) 
The EV energy constraint is presented in 
(4.26) 
 
4.3.2 Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints 
The stochastic bilevel model including multi-optimization problems transforms 
into a single optimization problem as a single-level stochastic MPEC [71]. The 
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lower problems are continuous linear and can be replaced by their KKT 
conditions.  
4.3.2.1 KKT Conditions Corresponding to the Day-ahead Lower 
Level  
The corresponding Lagrangian function of a day-ahead clearing problem is 
defined as follows: 
 
 
(4.27) 
The first-order KKT conditions associated with the day-ahead lower level 
according to Lagrangian function (4.27) are derived as given by: 
(4.27a) 
 
 
 
4.3 Mathematical Model Formulation  
 
69 
 
(4.27b) 
(4.27c) 
(4.27d) 
(4.27e) 
(4.27f) 
(4.27g) 
(4.27h) 
(4.27i) 
(4.27j) 
(4.27k) 
(4.27l) 
where denotes the inner product of two vectors equal to zero [57]. 
4.3.2.2 KKT Conditions Corresponding to the Real-time Lower 
Level  
The corresponding Lagrangian function of the real-time clearing problems is 
defined as follows: 
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(4.28) 
The first-order KKT conditions associated with the real-time lower level 
according to Lagrangian function (4.28) are derived as given by” 
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(4.28a) 
(4.28b) 
(4.28c) 
(4.28d) 
(4.28e) 
(4.28f) 
(4.28g) 
(4.28h) 
(4.28i) 
(4.28j) 
(4.28k) 
(4.28l) 
(4.28m) 
(4.28n) 
(4.28o) 
(4.28p) 
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(4.28q) 
(4.28r) 
(4.28s) 
(4.28t) 
(4.28x) 
(4.28y) 
4.3.2.3 KKT Conditions Corresponding to the EV Lower Level  
The corresponding Lagrangian function of the EV lower-level problem is 
defined as follows: 
 
 
(4.29) 
The first-order KKT conditions associated with the real-time lower level 
according to Lagrangian function (4.29) are derived as given by 
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(4.29a) 
(4.29b) 
(4.29c) 
4.3.2.4 Strong Duality Theorem Corresponding to the Day-ahead 
Lower Level  
Equation (4.30) enforces the strong duality equality associated with the day-
ahead objective function.  
 
(4.30) 
4.3.2.5 Strong Duality Theorem Corresponding to the Real-time 
Lower Level  
Equation (4.31) enforces the strong duality equality associated with the day-
ahead objective function.  
 
 
 
4.3 Mathematical Model Formulation  
 
74 
 
 
(4.31) 
4.3.2.6 Strong Duality Theorem Corresponding to the EV Lower 
Level  
Equation (4.32) enforces the strong duality equality associated with EV lower 
problem. 
 (4.31) 
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4.3.3 Mixed-Integer Linear Programming 
The MPEC are converted to a MILP by the linearizing of two nonlinearities 
including complementarity conditions and nonlinear terms as follows. 
4.3.3.1 Linearization of Complementarity Conditions  
The complementarity conditions in the form of  can be linearized 
by 
,  (4.32) 
where   is an auxiliary binary variable, and  and   are large enough 
constants. Note that the values of  and  are selected by trial-and error 
approach as used in [21].  
1) Mixed-integer linear equivalents of the complementarity conditions in 
section 4.3.2.1 from equation (4.27e) to (4.27l): 
(4.27e1) 
(4.27e2) 
(4.27e3) 
(4.27f1) 
(4.27f2) 
(4.27f3) 
(4.27g1) 
(4.27g2) 
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(4.27g3) 
(4.27h1) 
(4.27h2) 
(4.27h3) 
(4.27i1) 
(4.27i2) 
(4.27i3) 
(4.27j1) 
(4.27j2) 
(4.27j3) 
(4.27k1) 
(4.27k2) 
(4.28k3) 
(4.27l1) 
(4.27l2) 
(4.27l3) 
where are large enough positive 
constants and  are binary variables.  
2) Mixed-integer linear equivalents of the complementarity conditions in 
section 4.3.2.2 from equation (4.28g) to (4.28y): 
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(4.28g1) 
(4.28g2) 
(4.28g3) 
(4.28h1) 
(4.28h2) 
(4.28h3) 
(4.28i1) 
(4.28i2) 
(4.28i3) 
(4.28j1) 
(4.28j2) 
(4.28j3) 
(4.28k1) 
(4.28k2) 
(4.28k3) 
(4.28l1) 
(4.28l2) 
(4.28l3) 
(4.28m1) 
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(4.28m2) 
(4.28m3) 
(4.28n1) 
(4.28n2) 
(4.28n3) 
(4.28o1) 
(4.28o2) 
(4.28o3) 
(4.28p1) 
(4.28p2) 
(4.28p3) 
(4.28q1) 
(4.28q2) 
(4.28q3) 
(4.28r1) 
(4.28r2) 
(4.28r3) 
(4.28s1) 
(4.28s2) 
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(4.28s3) 
(4.28t1) 
(4.28t2) 
(4.28t3) 
(4.28x1) 
(4.28x2) 
(4.28x3) 
(4.28y1) 
(4.28y2) 
(4.28y3) 
where are large enough positive 
constants and  are binary variables.  
3) Mixed-integer linear equivalents of the complementarity conditions section 
4.3.2.3 from equation (4.29b) to (4.29c): 
(4.29b1) 
(4.29b2) 
(4.29b3) 
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(4.29c1) 
(4.29c2) 
(4.29c3) 
where     and  are large enough positive constants and  are binary 
variables.  
4.3.3.2 Linearization of Nonlinear terms 
Nonlinear terms in  can be linearized by the strong duality conditions, and 
KKT equalities as discussed in [21-22]. 
 (4.33) 
The objective function includes only one nonlinear term ( which is a 
bilinear one. Hence, discretising with reasonable step size is found to be a 
sufficiently accurate approximation as used in [24]. 
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4.4 Case Studies and Numerical Results 
To test the proposed model, the total demand is considered as 4.5GWh with five 
demand blocks of 2.25, 0.675, 0.675, 0.45, and 0.45 GWh. Fig. 4.4 provides 
demand bid prices for each period of time in five demand blocks. The system has 
a WGenCo with a single wind farm and two CGenCos including nuclear, and gas 
units which are assumed to be dispatchable. Generator data are listed in Table 
4.1. The total power capacities of wind and dispatchable units are the 
percentages of a total installed CGenCo power capacity (       ) of 5GW (see 
Table 4.1).  
The number of intra-hour intervals is 6 (i.e. 10 min each). Figs. 4.5 and 4.6 
show the intra-hourly wind power generation forecasted and EV penetration 
forecasted, respectively. 
Table 4.1 
Summary of Data 
Unit Type Nuclear Gas 
  
    (MW) 1500 3500 
Cg ($/MWh) 12 30 
     
        
     (% of    
   )  0 50% 
Total Demand (MW) 4500 
        (MW) 5000 
Total Wind (MW) 20% of         
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Fig. 4.4 Demand bid prices in five demand blocks 
 
Fig. 4.5 The intra-hourly wind power generation forecasted for ten scenarios. 
 
Fig. 4.6 The intra-hourly EV penetration forecasted for ten scenarios. 
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The maximum EV charging power is assumed to be 7.3kW, and the energy 
capacity of each EV is 27.4 kWh. Average annual driving distance of an EV is 
assumed to be 20,000 km with an average daily distance of 52.91 km. The 
required energy for an EV is 9 kWh/day with an average of 5.87 km/kWh [30]. 
We assume that the required energy for driving in one direction is the same as 
that of returning to the starting point. For the EV aggregator, we consider 
different EV numbers from one thousand to one hundred thousand. The EV fleet 
has its own commute time based on factors including region, city, and traffic 
patterns.  In this chapter, the number of EV fleets is assumed to be one with 
commute intervals between 7 A.M. and 9 A.M., and between P.M. and 8 P.M. 
The proposed model is utilized to consider endogenous tariffs. In this context, 
both fixed-rate and ToU tariffs and the impact of the tariffs on the wholesale-
level market output are studied. In the fixed-rate tariff, the rate of charges and 
payments of an EV owner are considered to be fixed. Contrariwise, in ToU tariff 
this rate changes in different periods of the day including off-peak, peak, and 
base [11]. 
The market output in terms of the payoff, price, and generation and demand 
dispatch is analyzed. 
4.4.1 Payoff and Price Analysis 
The WGenCo profit and total payoff versus EV numbers at both fixed-rate and 
ToU tariffs are shown in Figs. 4.7 and 4.8 respectively. The day-ahead 
equilibrium prices with respect to 50,000 and 100,000 EV numbers, and using 
fixed-rate and ToU tariffs are shown in Figs. 4.9-4.12, respectively.  
Comparing Figs. 4.9 and 4.11 shows that the increase in the EV number 
results in the decrease in the day-ahead equilibrium price because of the imposed 
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fixed-rate tariff. On the basis of this, the firm’s total expected profit decreases 
with more EV numbers using fixed-rate tariff as shown in Fig. 4.8.  However, 
using the ToU tariff increases the firm’s expected profit with higher penetration 
of EVs. Comparing Figs. 4.10 and 4.12 shows that the increase in the EV number 
does not change the day-ahead equilibrium price because of the greater flexibility 
of the ToU tariff. Fig. 4.7 shows that the WGenCo’s profit increases with higher 
penetration of EVs for two kinds of tariffs. It means that the increased EV 
number results in more wind energy contribution in the market.  
The EV aggregator’s profit is obtained through purchasing energy from the 
market and selling it to EV owners at a certain tariff. According to Figs. 4.10 
and 4.12, using the ToU tariff reduces the difference between DA price and ToU 
tariffs (see Figs. 4.9—4.12), and then decreases the EV aggregator’s profit in 
comparison with using the fixed-rate tariff (see Table 4.2). 
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Fig. 4.7.  Impact of EV numbers and tariffs on WGenCo profit  
 
 
Fig. 4.8.  Impact of EV numbers and tariffs on the total profit  
Table 4.2 
EV Aggregator’s Profit 
 1k EV 30k EV 50k EV 100k EV 
Fixed-rate tariff 1,247 15,498 27,871 52,197 
ToU tariff 463 -1,986 -742 -2,995 
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Fig. 4.9.  Impact of fixed-rate tariff and 50,000 EVs on the day-ahead price 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.10.  Impact of ToU tariff and 50,000 EVs tariff on the day-ahead price 
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Fig. 4.11.  Impact of fixed-rate tariff and 100,000 EVs on the day-ahead price 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.12.  Impact of ToU tariff and 100,000 EVs on the day-ahead price 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4 Case Studies and Numerical Results 
 
88 
 
4.4.2 Demand and Generation Dispatch Analysis 
The conventional and wind power generations, and EV and load demand 
schedule with respect to 50,000 and 100,000 EV numbers, and fixed-rate and 
ToU tariffs are shown in Figs. 4.13 -4.16,  respectively. As is clear from these 
figures, the required EV demand is supplied from the WGenCo. Therefore, it 
avoids shifting the emissions of the transportation sector to the electricity sector. 
It can be observed that the EV aggregator prefers to charge EVs during off peak 
between 1 A.M. to 6 A.M. Indeed, the difference between the EV tariff and the 
market price in these hours is high and EVs are available to be charged. 
By comparing fixed-rate and ToU tariff in Fig. 4.17, it is obvious that the 
increase in the EV number enhances the total demand and CGenCo power 
because of the imposed fixed-rate tariff and less DA market price. However, using 
ToU tariff does not affect the total demand and CGenCo power with higher 
penetration of EV due to the flexibility of the ToU tariff and the consistency in 
the DA market price. 
On the other hand, wind power penetration increases through greater numbers 
of EVs for two kinds of tariff as shown in Fig. 4.18. In addition, Fig. 4.19 shows 
the reduction in the wind curtailment with higher penetration of EVs. 
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Fig. 4.13.  Impact of fixed-rate tariff and 50,000 EVs on generation and demand dispatch 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.14.  Impact of ToU tariff and 50,000 EVs on generation and demand dispatch 
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Fig. 4.15.  Impact of fixed-rate tariff and 100,000 EVs on generation and demand 
dispatch 
 
 
Fig. 4.16.  Impact of ToU tariff and 100,000 EVs on generation and demand dispatch 
Wind Power 
EV Charge 
Wind Power 
EV Charge 
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Fig. 4.17.  Impact of tariffs and EV numbers on total demand and CGenCo power 
generation 
 
Fig. 4.18.  Impact of tariffs and EV numbers on wind power generation 
 
Fig. 4.19.  Impact of tariffs and EV numbers on wind curtailment 
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4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, two levels are introduced as wholesale-level and EV-level in the 
electricity market. At the wholesale-level, an optimal bidding/offering strategy 
for the EV load aggregator providing the energy and ancillary services in 
coordination with a strategic producer in a pool-based electricity market is 
modelled. At the EV-level, EV owners connect to the EV aggregator in order to 
take part in the market indirectly for obtaining maximum EV energy capacity 
and optimal charging tariff based on achieved day-ahead and real-time market 
data. 
The proposed formulation of a stochastic intra-hour bilevel optimization 
problem is given by an MPEC. The MPEC includes the strategic firm’s profit 
maximization as an upper-level problem, subject to three lower level problems: 
DA and RT social welfare maximizations, and the EV owners’ battery energy 
maximization. The impact of EV numbers, and using both fixed-rate and ToU 
tariff on the price and market outcome are investigated. The results show that 
the EV-level market outputs affect the behaviour of the wholesale-level market.  
Through the model, the required EV charging demand is supplied by WGenCo 
(wind energy) in order to reduce the emissions in transportation and electricity 
segments. Furthermore, high penetration of EVs leads to increasing wind power 
generation and reducing wind power curtailment. 
The EV tariff and numbers and their trading at the EV-level can influence the 
market price and power generation at the wholesale-level. As the EV aggregator 
has to purchase energy from the wholesale-level market with uncertainty in prices 
and sell it to EV customers, using ToU tariffs can reduce this influence.  
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Chapter 5  
Pool Strategy of Multiple Firms in 
Coordination with EV Load Aggregators  
5.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to develop the coordination strategy for the EV 
load aggregator with the CGenCos and WGenCos in multiple strategic firms 
competing with each other.  
Similarly to Chapter 4, CGenCos, WGenCos, and EV aggregators considered 
in this chapter are strategic. An optimal bidding/offering strategy is developed 
for the EV load aggregator providing the energy and ancillary services. The 
optimal offering strategies are developed for CGenCos and WGenCos. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the 
market framework and approach. Section 5.3 provides a formulation of a bilevel 
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model. Test of the proposed market model through case studies is described in 
Section 5.4. Finally, Section 5.5 concludes, summarizing the chapter. 
5.2 Market Framework and Approach 
The market frame used in this chapter is similar to one proposed in Chapter 4, in 
spite of multiple strategic firms. At the wholesale-level, strategic firms including 
CGenCos, WGenCos, and EV aggregators submit supply-offers/demand-bids to 
the MO to participate in the day-ahead and real-time market directly. At the 
EV-level, EV owners connect to each EV aggregator in order to take part in the 
market indirectly. EV aggregators maximize the EV energy capacities and 
determine optimal charging tariff based on achieved day-ahead and real-time 
data. Fig. 5.1 shows two levels of market framework are introduced in this 
chapter which are wholesale-level and EV-level for multiple strategic firms. 
However, an EPEC is established to consider all strategic firms in this chapter. 
Similarly to Chapter 4, the upper-level problem of the bilevel model maximizes 
the expected profit of each strategic firm, and its lower-level problems represent 
different market clearing. Then, substituting the lower-level problems with their 
optimality conditions in the single firm model extracts an MPEC for each 
strategic firm. The combination of multiple firms MPEC constitutes an EPEC. 
The optimality conditions of the EPEC are linearized by formulating and solving 
a MILP problem. Finally, a diagonalization algorithm is executed to verify each 
solution as a real Nash equilibrium. Fig. 5.2 shows six steps to determine the 
market equilibria. 
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Fig. 5.2  The steps to obtain the market equilibria  
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5.3 Formulation of Bilevel Model 
The single-period bilevel problem for each strategic firm Y is constructed and 
then converted into a single MPEC.  Finally, the EPEC problem is formulated. 
The single-period objective function (5.1a) maximizes the expected profits of 
each strategic firm Y which owns both CGenCos and WGenCos and constitutes 
unidirectional V2G services. Similar to Chapter 4 Subsections 4.3.1.1—4, three 
single-period lower-level problems including the day-ahead market, real-time 
market, and EV energy market clearing, which aim to maximize the social welfare 
and are subject to the power balance, and power constraints, are presented as 
follows: 
(5.1a) 
Subject to:  
 
(5.1b) 
 (5.1c) 
 (5.1d) 
 (5.1e) 
 (5.1f) 
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  (5.1g) 
(5.2a) 
          :  (5.2b) 
(5.2c) 
(5.2d) 
(5.2e) 
(5.2f) 
  (5.3a) 
  
:            
(5.3b) 
(5.3c) 
(5.3d) 
(5.3c) 
(5.3e) 
(5.3f) 
(5.3g) 
(5.3h) 
(5.3i) 
(5.3j) 
(5.3k) 
(5.4a) 
  (5.4b) 
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                         :   
(5.4c) 
     (5.4d) 
The dual variables are shown at the corresponding constraints following a colon. 
5.3.1 Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints 
The stochastic bilevel model including multi-optimization problems transforms 
into a single optimization problem as a single-level stochastic MPEC as follows:  
  (5.5a) 
The lower problems are continuous linear and they can be replaced by their 
KKT conditions.  
(5.5b) 
(5.5c) 
(5.5d) 
(5.5e) 
(5.5f) 
(5.5g) 
          :  (5.5h) 
(5.5i) 
(5.5j) 
 
 
 
5.3 Formulation of Bilevel Model 
100 
 
(5.5k) 
(5.5l) 
(5.5m) 
(5.5n) 
(5.5o) 
(5.5p) 
(5.5q) 
(5.5r) 
(5.5s) 
(5.5t) 
   (5.5u) 
  
:            (5.5v) 
(5.5w) 
(5.5x) 
(5.5y) 
(5.5z) 
(5.6a) 
(5.6b) 
(5.6c) 
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(5.6d) 
(5.6e) 
(5.6f) 
(5.6g) 
(5.6h) 
(5.6i) 
(5.6j) 
(5.6k) 
(5.6l) 
(5.6m) 
(5.6n) 
(5.6o) 
(5.6p) 
(5.6q) 
(5.6r) 
(5.6s) 
(5.6t) 
 
(5.6u) 
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                                                          :   
(5.6v) 
(5.6w) 
(5.6x) 
(5.6y) 
(5.6z) 
   
(5.7a) 
5.3.2 Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints 
The joint solution of the MPECs of all firms (5.5a)—(5.7a) constitutes an EPEC, 
which is illustrated in Fig. 1.3, Chapter 1. The EPEC solution determines the 
market equilibria associated with their corresponding KKT conditions. The 
formulation is as follows: 
The equality constraints of MPECs of all firms (5.5a)—(5.7d) are as follows:  
(5.5h), (5.5m)-(5.5p), (5.5u), (5.6g)- (5.6l), (5.6u), (5.6v), 
(5.6w), (5.6y), (5.7a)  (5.8) 
The equality constraints derived from the Lagrangian of all firms MPECs 
(5.5a)—(5.7a) with respect to variables are as follows: 
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(5.9a) 
(5.9b) 
(5.9c) 
(5.9d) 
(5.9e) 
(5.9f) 
(5.9g) 
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(5.9h) 
(5.9i) 
(5.9j) 
(5.9k) 
(5.9l) 
(5.9m) 
(5.9n) 
(5.9o) 
(5.9p) 
(5.9q) 
(5.9r) 
(5.9s) 
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(5.9t) 
(5.9u) 
(5.9x) 
(5.9y) 
(5.9w) 
(5.9z) 
(5.10a) 
(5.10b) 
(5.10c) 
(5.10d) 
(5.10e) 
(5.10f) 
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(5.10g) 
=0 (5.10h) 
(5.10i) 
(5.10j) 
(5.10k) 
(5.10l) 
(5.10m) 
(5.10n) 
(5.10o) 
(5.10p) 
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(5.10q) 
(5.10rs) 
(5.10t) 
(5.10u) 
(5.10x) 
(5.10y) 
(5.10w) 
(5.10z) 
(5.11a) 
(5.11b) 
(5.11c) 
(5.11d) 
(5.11e) 
(5.11f) 
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(5.11g) 
(5.11h) 
(5.11i) 
(5.11j) 
(5.11k) 
The complementarity conditions of all firms’ MPECs (5.5a)—(5.7a) are as 
follows: 
(5.12a) 
(5.12b) 
(5.12c) 
(5.12d) 
(5.12e) 
(5.12f) 
(5.12g) 
(5.12h) 
(5.12i) 
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(5.12j) 
(5.12k) 
(5.12l) 
(5.12m) 
(5.12n) 
(5.12o) 
(5.12p) 
(5.12q) 
(5.12r) 
(5.12s) 
(5.12t) 
(5.12u) 
(5.12v) 
(5.12w) 
(5.12x) 
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(5.12y) 
(5.12z) 
(5.13a) 
(5.13b) 
(5.13c) 
(5.13d) 
(5.13e) 
(5.13f) 
(5.13g) 
(5.13h) 
(5.13i) 
(5.13j) 
(5.13k) 
(5.13l) 
(5.13m) 
 
 
 
5.3 Formulation of Bilevel Model 
111 
 
(5.13n) 
(5.13o) 
(5.13p) 
(5.13q) 
(5.13r) 
(5.13s) 
(5.13t) 
(5.13u) 
(5.13v) 
(5.13w) 
(5.13x) 
(5.13y) 
(5.13z) 
(5.14a) 
(5.14b) 
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(5.14c) 
(5.14d) 
(5.14e) 
(5.14f) 
5.3.3 Mixed-Integer Linear Programming 
The EPEC (5.8)—(5.14f) are converted to a MILP by linearizing of three 
nonlinearities including the nonlinear terms in the strong duality equalities, the 
complementarity conditions, and the nonlinear terms comprising , , and 
. 
5.3.3.1 Linearization of Nonlinear Terms in the Strong Duality 
Equalities 
Nonlinear terms in the strong duality equality (5.5u) are replaced by the 
complementarity conditions as follows: 
(5.15a) 
(5.15b) 
(5.15c) 
(5.15d) 
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(5.15e) 
(5.15f) 
(5.15g) 
(5.15h) 
Nonlinear terms in the strong duality equality (5.6u) are replaced by the 
complementarity conditions as follows: 
(5.16a) 
(5.16b) 
(5.16c) 
(5.16d) 
(5.16e) 
(5.16f) 
(5.16g) 
(5.16h) 
(5.16i) 
(5.16g) 
(5.16k) 
(5.16l) 
(5.16m) 
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(5.16n) 
(5.16o) 
(5.16p) 
Nonlinear terms in the strong duality equality (5.7a) are replaced by the 
complementarity conditions as follows: 
(5.17a) 
(5.17b) 
5.3.3.2 Linearization of  Complementarity Conditions  
Similar to Chapter 4, all complementarity conditions in the form of 
 can be linearized by 
,  (5.18) 
where   is an auxiliary binary variable, and  and   are large enough 
constants.  
5.3.3.3 Linearization of  Nonlinear Terms Comprising , , and 
 
The nonlinear terms comprising , , and  are linearized by 
parameterizing the KKT conditions of the EPEC. Since the set of multipliers 
forms a ray and some degrees of freedom, nonlinear terms are linearized by 
parameterizing [88]. 
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5.3.4 Diagonalization Algorithm  
Every EPEC solution is not essentially a Nash equilibrium. Based on the method 
proposed in [71], a one-iteration diagonalization algorithm is implemented in this 
thesis as shown in Fig. 5.3 to test each solution to be a real Nash equilibrium 
based on [91].  
For the results Q1 and Q2 achieved from the EPEC problem for firms Y1 and 
Y2, the results Q1 of firm Y1 is fixed, and then the MPEC problem related to its 
rival producer Y2 results in Q2*. If the results derived from the MPEC related to 
each firm are equal to the results obtained from the EPEC problem, the results 
Q1 and Q2 are a Nash equilibrium.  
 
Fig. 5.3  A one-iteration diagonalization algorithm 
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5.4 Case Studies and Numerical Results 
To test the proposed model, the total demand is considered as 3.5 GWh with two 
demand blocks of 2, and 1.5 GWh at the prices of $45/MWh and $35/MWh. The 
system has two WGenCo and four CGenCos including nuclear, coal, oil and gas 
units which are assumed to be dispatchable. Generators’ data are listed in Table 
5.1. The total power capacities of wind and dispatchable units are the percentages 
of a total installed CGenCo power capacity (P^CGenCo) of 3.5 GW (see Table 
5.1). The system has two EV aggregators with different EV numbers. The 
maximum EV charging power is assumed to be 7.3 kW, and the energy capacity 
of each EV is 27.4 kWh. Average annual driving distance of an EV is assumed to 
be 20,000 km with an average daily distance of 52.91 km. The required energy for 
an EV is 9 kWh/day with an average of 5.87 km/kWh [35]. 
Table 5.1 
Summary of Data 
Unit Type Nuclear Coal Oil Gas 
  
    (MW) 1500 1100 500 400 
Cg ($/MWh) 12 20 25 30 
     
        
     (% of    
   )  0 25% 50% 50% 
Total Demand (GW) 3.5 
        (GW) 3.5 
Total Wind (GW) 22% of         
 
Three firms associated with different combination of units are considered in 
four case studies as described in Table 5.2. In addition, three different cases are 
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considered for EV numbers including, without EV, 50,000 and 100,000 for each 
EV aggregator. 
We analyse the market output in terms of the payoff, price, and generation 
and demand dispatch. Note that there are an infinite number of Nash equilibria, 
whereas no firm wants to change its offering strategy. Therefore, we cannot 
guarantee that there are a finite or an infinite number of solutions [88]. 
Table 5.2 
The Combination of WGenCos, CGenCos, and EV Aggregators in Three Firms 
 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 
Case 1 All WGenCos, CGenCos, 
and EV aggregators 
- - 
Case 2 WGenCo1, Nuclear, and 
Oil  units, and EV 
aggregator1 
WGenCo2, Coal, and 
Gas  units, and EV 
aggregator2 
- 
Case 3 All WGenCos, and 
CGenCos 
All EV aggregators - 
Case 4 All WGenCos All CGenCos All EV aggregators 
 
5.4.1 Payoff and Price Analysis 
In all cases, some units offer the minimum bid price of the demands in the day-
ahead market. Therefore, the day-ahead market price and EV tariff are cleared in 
the price of $35/MWh. The output of the strategic firms is consistent with the 
outcomes of [13] and [88]. Table 5.3 demonstrate the details of the numerical 
results of the payoffs in different cases.  
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In Case 1 ( or single firm), all CGenCos, WGenCos and EV aggregators are 
considered as a single firm. The total profit of the firm increases with more EV 
numbers. However, the expected profit of EV aggregators is negative. The total 
expected profit of the single firm in Case 1 is higher than other cases as expected.  
Table 5.3 
Firms’ Payoff in Different Cases 
  Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Total 
Case 1 
Without EV $70550 - - $70550 
100,000 EV $72600 - - $72600 
200,000 EV $72855 - - $72855 
Case 2 
Without EV $25740 $43550 - $43550 
100,000 EV $27575 $44880 - $72455 
200,000 EV $27660 $45030 - $72690 
Case 3 
Without EV $70550 - - $70550 
100,000 EV $72170 $0 - $72170 
200,000 EV 72170 $0 - $72170 
Case 4 
Without EV $14630 $50650 - $65280 
100,000 EV $12880 $50650 $1260 $64790 
200,000 EV $12880 $52398 $2489.333 $67767.33 
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In Case 2, each two firms consist of a CGenCo, a WGenCo and an EV 
aggregator. The total profit of each firm increases with higher EV numbers and 
the expected profit of EV aggregators is positive. However, the expected profit of 
EV aggregators is lower than dispatchable units of CGenCos. 
In Case 3, EV aggregators as an individual firm are the rival of the other firm 
including conventional dispatchable units and WGenCos. It is observed that wind 
power deviations are compensated by the dispatchable units included in that 
firm. Therefore, the expected profit of EV aggregators is zero. Also, the results of 
Cases 1 and 3 for without EV are the same as expected. 
In Case 4 (or three separate firms), each CGenCo, WGenCo and EV 
aggregator is considered as an individual firm. The EV aggregators and 
dispatchable units of the CGenCo compete together to provide ancillary services 
for wind power deviation of the WGenCos. For 200,000 EVs, the expected profit 
of the EV aggregator is higher than other dispatchable units of CGenCos because 
of the dominant regulation ancillary capacity of  the EV aggregators. However, 
the total expected profit of all firms in Case 4 is lower than in other cases.  
In summary, the coordination strategy (Cases 1 and 2) in comparison with 
incoordination strategy (Cases 3 and 4) is more profitable and beneficial with 
increasing EV penetration. 
Tables C.1—C.4 demonstrate the details of the numerical results of the payoff, 
and prices for the four cases in Appendix C.  
5.4.2 Demand and Generation Dispatch Analysis 
Table 5.4 shows real-time wind power deviations and regulation up/down of the 
units to compensate those deviations in different scenarios for 200,000 EVs. In 
Case 2, the WGenCo of each firm trades with the dispatchable units owned by 
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that firm in the real-time market. For instance, wind power deviations in 
WGenCo 1 are compensated through the regulation up/down arranged by the Oil 
units and EV aggregator 1 into Firm 1. In Case 3, EV aggregators participate in 
the market as a separate firm (Firm 1) and compete with another firm including 
conventional dispatchable units and WGenCos. It is observed that wind power 
deviations are compensated by the dispatchable units included in that firm. 
Therefore, the EV aggregators do not contribute in regulation ancillary services. 
In Case 4, each CGenCo and EV aggregator compete together to allocate more 
share for ancillary services to compensate the real-time wind power deviations. In 
all cases, the regulation up is generally provided from the comparatively lower-
cost units, while the regulation down is generally procured through the 
comparatively expensive units due to the objective function solving the EPEC. 
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 demonstrate the demand curtailment and wind power 
curtailment in four cases for 200,000 and 100,000 EVs, respectively. The wind 
power curtailments are zero in all cases, since the MO maximizes social welfare in 
the objective function. The demand curtailment (cut-off demand) of LSE in the 
real-time markets is zero except in Case 4 due to three competing individual firms 
including EV aggregator, WGenCo, and CGenCo together. 
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 show regulation-up/down power of the EV aggregators and 
demand curtailment in Case 4 and Case 2, respectively. In both two cases, the 
EV aggregators contribute more regulation ancillary services with higher EV 
penetration. Moreover, the demand curtailment of LSE decreases with the 
increase in EV numbers.  
Tables C.5—C.8 demonstrate the details of the numerical results of the 
demand, and generation dispatch for the four cases in Appendix C.  
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Table 5.4 
Real-time Wind Power Deviations and Regulation up/down of the Units for 
200,000 EVs 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
Scenarios S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 
Wind Unit 1 +200 -20 -150 +200 -20 -150 +200 -20 -150 +200 -20 -150 
Wind Unit 2 +50 -20 -100 +50 -20 -100 +50 -20 -100 +50 -20 -100 
Nuclear Unit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Coal Unit 0 0 0 0 +40 +20 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Oil Unit -50 0 0 -50 +20 +40 -50 50 50 -250 -250 +250 
Gas Unit -200 35 35 -200 -20 0 -200 -10 200 -108 +200 -108 
EV Agg. 1 0 5 105 0 0 +110 0 0 0 0 80.48 0 
EV Agg. 2 0 0 110 0 0 +80 0 0 0 73.9 0 60.84 
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 
Table 5.5 
Demand Curtailment and Wind Power Curtailment for 200,000 EVs 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
Scenarios S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 
Demand 
Curtailment 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 34.1 9.52 47.16 
Wind Power 
Curtailment 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 5.6 
Demand Curtailment and Wind Power Curtailment for 100,000 EVs 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
Scenarios S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 
Demand 
Curtailment 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 163.8 36.36 181.8 
Wind Power 
Curtailment 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 5.7 
Regulation up/down of the EV aggregators and Demand Curtailment in Case 4 
 100,000 EVs 200,000 EVs 
Scenarios S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 
Demand Curtailment of LSE 163.8 36.36 181.8 34.1 9.52 47.16 
Total Regulation up/down of EV Agg. 36.2 53.64 18.2 73.9 80.48 60.84 
 
Table 5.8 
Regulation up/down of the EV aggregators and Demand Curtailment in Case 2 
 100,000 EVs 200,000 EVs 
Scenarios S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 
Demand Curtailment of LSE 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Regulation up/down of EV Agg. 0 0 110 0 0 190 
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5.5 Summary 
In this chapter, the optimal bidding/offering strategy for CGenCo, WGenCo, and 
EV load aggregator providing the energy and ancillary services is modelled for 
multiple firms at wholesale-level markets. At the EV-level, EV owners connect to 
the EV aggregator in order to take part in the market indirectly for obtaining 
maximum EV energy capacity and optimal charging tariff based on achieved day-
ahead and real-time market data.  
Therefore, the EV aggregator as a new player competes with the conventional 
dispatchable units to provide the energy and ancillary services. An equilibrium 
approach is used to model the interactions of the strategic firms and is solved by 
EPEC.  
Some case studies are used to validate the outcomes of the model. Moreover, 
impact of the increasing EV numbers in the model is investigated.  
The numerical results show the effectiveness of the coordination strategy which 
is profitable and beneficial with increasing EV penetration in comparison with the 
incoordination strategy. 
In other words, EV aggregators as an individual firm could not compete with 
other conventional dispatchable companies. Hence, merging EV aggregators in 
CGenCos’ and WGenCos’ portfolio would increase the payoff of EV aggregators  
and strategic firms. However, a sufficient EV number is a significant factor to 
affect market and EV aggregator outputs.  
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Chapter 6   
Conclusion and Future Research 
In this final chapter, a summary of the thesis is first presented. Next, a list of 
relevant contributions of the thesis is provided. Finally, some suggestions for 
future research are recommended. 
6.1 Summary 
This thesis focused on the impact of the participation of the EV load aggregator, 
and the coordination strategy on the market outcomes and prices. The 
coordination strategy means coordination between the EV load aggregator and 
generating companies through V2G technology.  
In this dissertation, we addressed the two matters below: 
1) Development of a power exchange between the EV load aggregators and 
WGenCos considered as price-takers in the energy and ancillary service 
markets (Chapter 3). 
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2) Development of a power exchange between the EV load aggregators and 
all generating companies considered as price-makers in the single and 
multiple firms (Chapters 4 and 5). 
6.1.1 Coordinating EV load aggregators and WGenCos 
as price-takers 
We developed a two-stage stochastic optimal offering/bidding strategy model for 
the coordinated EV-Wind units participating in the day-ahead energy, balancing, 
and regulation markets.  
An objective function as a single optimization problem maximized the profit of 
coordinated WGenCo and EV aggregator associated with equality or inequality 
constraints. 
We considered uncertainties in wind speed, energy prices, and EV owners’ 
behavior based on driving patterns. 
We investigated three different strategies including conventional systems 
(WGenCo without storage), WGenCo with an energy storage system, and a 
power system with a coordinated EV-Wind energy exchange. 
The numerical results showed that the effective coordination between a 
WGenCo participating and an EV aggregator participating in the energy and 
ancillary service markets increases the WGenCo’s competitiveness and mitigates 
wind and EV energy imbalance threats. 
6.1.2 Coordinating EV load aggregators and all GenCos 
as price-makers 
We developed a stochastic optimal bidding/offering strategy for the EV load 
aggregator providing the energy and ancillary services in coordination with single 
  
 
 
6.1 Summary 
127 
 
and multiple strategic firms in a pool-based electricity market with endogenous 
formation of day-ahead and real-time prices, and EV aggregator tariff. To 
consider EV aggregator tariff as an endogenous variable, we defined two levels in 
the electricity market comprising EV-level and wholesale-level markets. At 
wholesale-level market, MO runs day-ahead market and real-time market clearing. 
At EV-level market, the EV aggregator connect to EV owners to decide 
maximum EV energy capacity and optimal charging tariff based on achieved day-
ahead and real-time data. 
We used a bilevel model to model the behaviour of proposed markets. A bilevel 
problem includes an upper-level problem and a set of lower-level problems which 
are limited by the upper and lower equality and inequality constraints. The 
upper-level problem represents the strategic firm’s profit maximization. The 
lower-level problems include the day-ahead market, real-time market, and EV 
energy market clearing which aim to maximize the social welfare and are subject 
to the power balance, and power limits.  
We studied single and multiple strategic firms in the proposed markets. For 
single firm, a bilevel model including multi-optimization problems converts into a 
single optimization problem as a single-level stochastic MPEC. For multiple firms, 
multiple stochastic MPECs constitute an EPEC. Finally, all single and multiple 
firms’ problems are linearized by formulating and solving an MILP problem. 
The numerical results showed the effectiveness of the coordination strategy, 
which is profitable and beneficial with increasing EV penetration in comparison 
with the incoordination strategy. We concluded that EV aggregators as an 
individual firm could not compete with other conventional, dispatchable 
companies. Hence, merging EV aggregators in CGenCos’ and WGenCos’ portfolio 
would increase the payoff of EV aggregators and strategic firms. However, a 
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sufficient EV number is a significant factor to affect market and EV aggregator 
outputs.  
Moreover, the numerical results showed that the EV tariff and numbers at EV-
level can influence the market price and power generation at wholesale-level in 
the electricity market. In addition, the high penetration of EVs leads to increasing 
the wind power penetration and reducing the wind power curtailment. 
6.2 Main Contributions 
The main contributions of the thesis work which have been declared in the 
introduction of each chapter are classified here in more solid expressions as 
follows: 
1. For the coordinated EV-Wind and the ESS-Wind, developing a two-stage 
SLP-based optimal offering/bidding strategy model in the day-ahead 
energy, balancing, and regulation markets. 
2. Comprehensive comparisons of three strategies including the coordinated 
EV-Wind, the ESS-Wind, and conventional systems (WGenCo without 
energy storage).  
3. For the single and multiple firms including the coordinated EV 
aggregator, CGenCos and WGenCos, developing an optimal 
bidding/offering strategy model in a pool-based electricity market with 
endogenous formation of day-ahead and real-time prices, and EV 
aggregator tariff. 
4. Defining EV-level and wholesale-level in the electricity market to consider 
impact of EV aggregator tariff on the price and market outputs. 
5. Proposing formulation of a stochastic bilevel optimization problem 
including an upper-level problem and three lower-level problems for the 
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sake of a) the strategic firm’s profit maximization, and b) day-ahead and 
real-time social welfare maximization, and c) EV owner’s battery energy 
maximization, respectively.  
6. Comprehensive comparisons of different case studies including a) 
coordination and incoordination strategies; b) with and without EVs; c) 
the impact of different EV numbers; d) fixed-rate and ToU tariff; e) 
single and multiple firms. 
7. Considering the uncertainties associated with wind forecast, energy price, 
and EV owners’ behavior based on driving patterns. 
 
6.3 Recommendations for Future Research  
The concept of V2G in the electricity market is indeed a new and interesting 
research area to design the future structure and architecture of the electricity 
market. This concluding section proposes some relevant areas for future research 
as follows: 
1. Considering risk-constrained profit-maximization of a strategic firm such 
as conditional value at risk, (CVaR) to investigate the impact of risk 
aversion on market decisions. 
2. Considering the strategic LSEs through their demand function bids to 
award more flexibility for normal consumers as active players. 
3.  Integrating transmission networks and security constraints including a 
set of plausible contingencies, i.e., generators and transmission line 
outages into the market clearing problems.  
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4. Investigating the impact of subsidizing renewable energies and EVs 
policies on the economics of CGenCos and the electricity market. 
5. Studying the impact of the proposed market considered in this thesis on 
other markets such as futures market, and gas and oil markets.  
6. Comparing a robust model with a stochastic programming model 
considered in the thesis work. 
7. Developing an analytical sensitivity analysis tool to evaluate the effect of 
the diverse parameters on the market outputs. 
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Appendix A 
Scenario Generation and Reduction 
Techniques  
There are several different scenario generation and reduction techniques for 
stochastic programming [59]. The Monte Carlo simulations are applied to 
generate scenarios in [59]. In [60], the time series models are used to generate 
scenarios for prices in electricity markets. The most common scenario-reduction 
technique is based on Kantorovich distance [61]. In [62], a scenario generation for 
price forecasting is based on the roulette wheel mechanism. In this thesis, scenario 
generation and reduction techniques are used for simulating wind speed, energy 
price, and the number of EVs engaged as follows. 
A.1 Wind and Energy Price Scenarios 
Wind speed forecasting for the next day can be obtained from numerical 
meteorological programs, however, forecasts are never perfect. The ARMA model 
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is used to simulate wind speed forecast errors [63-64,57]. The ARMA (p, q) model 
for a stochastic process X is defined as: 
 (A.1) 
where p is autoregressive parameters , , . . ., , and q is moving average 
parameters , , . . ., ;  is a random Gaussian variable with standard 
deviation  [57]. 
The estimation and adjustment of ARMA models have been investigated in 
literature. In this thesis, the first order of the ARMA model, ARMA (1,1), is used 
to simulate wind speed forecasting errors. This approach has been suggested in 
[64], [57]: 
 
(A.2) 
where  is the wind speed forecast error at the time (t) forecast; and , and 
 are parameters. 
The estimation of parameters and  for a given wind speed forecast is done as 
suggested in [63]. ARMA parameters are obtained by minimizing the difference in 
the root mean square error between the simulated ARMA model and the wind 
speed measurement data [64], [101]. 
The real wind speed V(t) is calculated as the sum of the wind speed forecast 
 and the wind speed forecast error: 
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 (A.3) 
Once a large number of scenarios are generated, the wind speed scenarios are 
transformed into power scenarios through the power conversion curve for each 
wind turbine [12], [65].  
In addition, the process of scenario generation using the ARMA (1,1) model is 
as follows [57]. 
Step 1: Initialize the scenario counter: s ← 0. 
Step 2: Update the scenario counter and initialize the time period 
counter: s ← s + 1, t ← 0. 
Step 3: Update the time period counter: t ← t + 1. 
Step 4: Randomly generate Zt ∼ N(0, σ). 
Step 5: Evaluate . 
Step 6: If  go to Step 3), otherwise go to Step 7) 
Step 7: If  go to Step 2), otherwise the scenario-generation 
process concludes. 
Similarly, ARIMA models have been applied to forecast electricity prices, 
which appear non-stationary when the processes present a periodic or seasonal 
pattern [57], [102]. 
A.2 EV Number Scenarios 
Any driving profile has a commute time including morning and evening with the 
start and end times, and a commute distance. Major commuting would normally 
begin between 7 AM and 9 AM to go to work and between 5 PM and 8 PM to come 
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back from work. For all other times, the EVs are assumed to be available to be 
plugged into the electricity grid [66]. 
The EV availability at each interval has associated unplanned departure and 
arrival probabilities. The number of EVs is considered to be random, and Monte 
Carlo simulations are used to generate possible scenarios. 
The total number of EVs is 1p.u. It is assumed that on average, from 2 AM to 
5 AM, 98% of EVs are plugged-in with a standard deviation of 5%. For commute 
periods, on average, 20% of EVs are plugged-in with a standard deviation of 10%, 
and during other periods it is assumed that 85% of EVs are plugged-in with a 
standard deviation of 20% [9]. The availability of EVs in various time periods is 
shown in Table A.1.  
Table A.1 
The Availability of EVs in Various Time Intervals 
Hour 
2:00 
5:00 
5:00 
7:00 
7:00 
9:00 
9:00 
17:00 
17:00 
20:00 
20:00 
2:00 
St.dev (%) 5 20 10 20 10 20 
Mean (pu) 0.98 0.85 0.20 0.85 0.20 0.85 
 
A.3 Scenario Reduction 
In stochastic optimization problems with various inherent uncertainties, a large 
number of scenarios can emerge. It can, therefore, be computationally expensive. 
Therefore, a technique for reducing the number of scenarios is required.  
In this paper, the scenario reduction algorithm is based on [67], [68]. The basic 
idea of the scenario reduction is to eliminate scenarios with low-probabilities, and 
cluster similar scenarios [69], [101]. The new probability of a preserved scenario is 
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determined as the sum of its initial probability and the probabilities of similar 
scenarios that have been eliminated. We used SCENRED as a tool for scenario 
reduction [69]. SCENRED contains three reduction algorithms: the fast backward 
method, a mix of fast backward/forward methods and a mix of fast 
backward/backward methods. The algorithms have different computational 
performances, and the choice of algorithms for a certain problem depends on the 
size of the problem and the required solution accuracy. The strategy used in [67-
69] recommends that the optimal deletion of scenarios should be determined by a 
conceptual algorithm called backward reduction. If the number of preserved 
scenarios is small (strong reduction), the optimal selection of a single scenario 
may be repeated recursively until a prescribed number of preserved scenarios is 
selected. This strategy provides the basic concept of the conceptual algorithm 
called forward selection. In this paper, the fast backward/forward method is 
selected to reduce the number of scenarios [68]. 
The uncertainties characterizing the stochastic data are modeled through a 
symmetric scenario tree [65]. Each branch of the scenario tree includes three 
nodes: the day-ahead energy price, wind power outputs, and EV penetration. The 
scenario tree generation process is described as follows: 
Step 1: Generate a set of 10,000 day-ahead price scenarios ( ).  
Step 2: Generate a set of 10,000 wind power scenarios ( ) for each of 
the day-ahead price scenarios. 
Step 3: Generate a set of 10,000 EV number scenarios ( ) for each of 
the wind power scenarios.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A.2 EV Number Scenario 
136 
 
 
Fig. A.1  A path through the tree is called a scenario and consists of realizations 
of all random variables. 
The total number of scenarios making the tree is , 
which makes the size of the tree too large for the optimization problem to be 
tractable. Therefore, a reduction technique proposed in [69] is used to reduce the 
number of   and to 10 each, i.e., the reduced tree consists of 103 
scenarios [65]. 
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Appendix B 
Absolute Value of the Variable in the 
MILP  
To represent the absolute value of variable x in a linear form for MILP 
formulation, the following equations are used: 
 (B.1) 
 
 
(B.2) 
 
For  : 
if  
 
(B.3) 
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if  (B.4) 
 
For    : 
if  
 
(B.5) 
if  (B.6) 
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Appendix C 
 
Additional Data 
This section includes the additional data on the multiple firms in coordination 
with EV load aggregators (chapter 5) to discuss the payoff and price, and demand 
and generation dispatch analysis for case studies 1-4 (Section 5.4). In Case 1 (or 
single firm), all CGenCos, WGenCos and EV aggregators are considered as a 
single firm. In Case 2, each two firms consist of a CGenCo, a WGenCo and an 
EV aggregator. In Case 3, EV aggregators as an individual firm are the rival of 
the other firm including conventional dispatchable units and WGenCos. In Case 4 
(or three separate firms), each CGenCo, WGenCo and EV aggregator is 
considered as an individual firm. 
Tables C.1—C.4 demonstrate the details of the numerical results of the payoff, 
and prices for the four cases.  
Tables C.5—C.8 demonstrate the details of the numerical results of the 
demand, and generation dispatch for the four cases.  
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Table C.1 
The Results of Profit and Prices for Case 1 
 
  Without EV 100,000 EVs 200,000 EVs 
P
ri
ce
s DA Market Price ($/MWh) 35 35 35 
EV Tariff ($/MWh) - 35 35 
RT Market Prices ($/MWh) 70 70 0 0 0 70 70 0 0 
P
ro
fi
ts
 Total Profit ($) 70550 72600 72855 
Total Profit of Firm 1 ($) 70550 72600 72855 
Total Profit of Firm 2 ($) - - - 
Total Profit of Firm 3 ($) - - - 
 
W
in
d
 
U
n
it
Y
1
 Expected Profit ($) 12740 6300 13300 
DA Offer Price ($/MWh) 35 35 35 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) 0 0 0 0 0 0 70 0 0 
 
W
in
d
 
U
n
it
Y
1
 Expected Profit ($) 7140 4200 7700 
DA Offer Price ($/MWh) 35 35 35 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) 0 0 0 0 0 0 70 0 0 
 
N
u
cl
ea
r 
U
n
it
Y
1
 Expected Profit ($) 34500 34500 34500 
DA Offer Price ($/MWh) 35 0 0 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) 0 0 0 0 0 0 70 0 0 
 
C
o
a
l 
U
n
it
Y
1
 Expected Profit ($) 16500  16118.5  16500  
DA Offer Price ($/MWh) 35 35 35 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) 70 70 0 0 0 70 70 0 0 
 
O
il
 
U
n
it
Y
1
 Expected Profit ($) 2520   3250 4550  
DA Offer Price ($/MWh) 35 35 35 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) 70 70 0 0 0 70 70 0 0 
 
G
a
s 
U
n
it
Y
1
 Expected Profit ($)  -2850  4140 -615  
DA Offer Price ($/MWh) 35 35 35 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) 70 70 0 0 0 70 70 0 0 
 
E
V
 A
g
g
 
Y
1
 
Expected Profit ($) - 770 -1540 
DA Bid Price ($/MWh) - 35 35 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) - - - 0 0 70 70 0 0 
 
E
V
 A
g
g
 
Y
1
 
Expected Profit ($) - 3321.5 -1540 
DA Bid Price ($/MWh) - 35 35 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) - - - 0 0 70 70 0 0 
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Table C.2 
The Results of Profit and Prices for Case 2 
   Without EV 100,000 EVs 200,000 EVs 
P
ri
ce
s DA Market Price ($/MWh) 35 35 35 
EV Tariff ($/MWh) - 35 35 
RT Market Prices ($/MWh) 70 22.5 27.5 25 27.5 46.25 20 30 47.5 
P
ro
fi
ts
 Total Profit ($) 69290 72455 72690 
Total Profit of Firm 1 ($) 25740 27575 27660 
Total Profit of Firm 2 ($) 43550 44880 45030 
Total Profit of Firm 3 ($) - - - 
W
in
d
 
U
n
it
Y
1
 Expected Profit ($) 11170 8505 8210 
DA Offer Price ($/MWh) 35 35 35 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W
in
d
 
U
n
it
Y
2
 Expected Profit ($) 6220 5180 5060 
DA Offer Price ($/MWh) 35 35 35 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N
u
cl
ea
r 
U
n
it
Y
2
 Expected Profit ($) 34500 34500 34500 
DA Offer Price ($/MWh) 0 0 0 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C
o
a
l 
U
n
it
Y
1
 Expected Profit ($) 13420 16500 16500 
DA Offer Price ($/MWh) 35 35 35 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) 70 22.7 27.5 25 27.5 46.25 20 30 47.5 
O
il
 
U
n
it
Y
2
 Expected Profit ($) 2830 4952.5 5070 
DA Offer Price ($/MWh) 35 35 35 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) 70 22.5 27.7 25 28 46.25 20 30 47.5 
G
a
s 
U
n
it
Y
1
 Expected Profit ($)  1150   2400  
DA Offer Price ($/MWh) 35 35 34.96 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) 70 22.7 27.5 25 27.5 46.25 20 30 47.5 
E
V
 A
g
g
 
Y
1
 
Expected Profit ($) - 247.5 550 
DA Bid Price ($/MWh) - 35 35 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) - - - 25 27.5 46.25 20 30 47.5 
E
V
 A
g
g
 
Y
2
 
Expected Profit ($) - 247.5 400 
DA Bid Price ($/MWh) - 35 35 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) - - - 25 27.5 46.25 20 30 47.5 
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Table C.3 
The Results of Profit and Prices for Case 3 
   Without EV 100,000 EVs 200,000 EVs 
P
ri
ce
s DA Market Price ($/MWh) 35 35 35 
EV Tariff ($/MWh) - 35 35 
RT Market Prices ($/MWh) 70 70 0 0 70 70 0 70 0 
P
ro
fi
ts
 Total Profit ($) 70550 72170 72170 
Total Profit of Firm 1 ($) 70550 72170 72170 
Total Profit of Firm 2 ($) - 0 0 
Total Profit of Firm 3 ($) - - - 
W
in
d
 
U
n
it
Y
1
 Expected Profit ($) 12740 5740 9940 
DA Offer Price ($/MWh) 35 35 35 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W
in
d
 
U
n
it
 
Y
1
 
Expected Profit ($) 7140 3640 6440 
DA Offer Price ($/MWh) 35 35 35 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N
u
cl
ea
r 
U
n
it
Y
1
 Expected Profit ($) 34500 34500 34500 
DA Offer Price ($/MWh) 0 0 0 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C
o
a
l 
U
n
it
Y
1
 Expected Profit ($) 16500  17550 16500 
DA Offer Price ($/MWh) 35 35 35 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) 70 70 0 0 70 70 0 70 0 
O
il
 
U
n
it
Y
1
 Expected Profit ($) 2520  5500 5150 
DA Offer Price ($/MWh) 35 35 35 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) 70 70 0 0 70 70 0 70 0 
G
a
s 
U
n
it
 
Y
1
 
Expected Profit ($)  -2850 5240 -360  
DA Offer Price ($/MWh) 35 35 35 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) 70 70 0 0 70 70 0 70 0 
E
V
 A
g
g
 
Y
2
 
Expected Profit ($) - 0 0 
DA Bid Price ($/MWh) - 35 35 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) - - - 0 70 70 0 70 0 
E
V
 A
g
g
 
Y
2
 
Expected Profit ($) - 0 0 
DA Bid Price ($/MWh) - 35 35 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) - - - 0 70 70 0 70 0 
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Table C.4 
The Results of Profit and Prices for Case 4 
   Without EV 100,000 EVs 200,000 EVs 
P
ri
ce
s DA Market Price ($/MWh) 35 35 35 
EV Tariff ($/MWh) - 35 35 
RT Market Prices ($/MWh) 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
P
ro
fi
ts
 Total Profit ($) 65280 64790 67767.333 
Total Profit of Firm 1 ($) 14630 12880 12880 
Total Profit of Firm 2 ($) 50650 50650 52398 
Total Profit of Firm 3 ($) - 1260 2489.333 
W
in
d
 
U
n
it
 
Y
1
 
Expected Profit ($) 8540 8540 8540 
DA Offer Price ($/MWh) 35 35 35 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W
in
d
 
U
n
it
Y
1
 Expected Profit ($) 6090 4340 4340 
DA Offer Price ($/MWh) 35 0 35 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N
u
cl
ea
r 
U
n
it
Y
2
 Expected Profit ($) 34500 34500 34500 
DA Offer Price ($/MWh) 0 0 0 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C
o
a
l 
U
n
it
Y
2
 Expected Profit ($) 16500 16500 16500 
DA Offer Price ($/MWh) 35 35 35 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
O
il
 
U
n
it
Y
2
 Expected Profit ($) 250 250 250 
DA Offer Price ($/MWh) 35 35 35 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) 70 70 70 70 70 70 78.57 78.57 70 
G
a
s 
U
n
it
Y
2
 Expected Profit ($)  -600  -600 1148  
DA Offer Price ($/MWh) 35 35 34.96 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) 70 70 70 70 70 70 73.81 70 77.61 
E
V
 A
g
g
 
Y
3
 
Expected Profit ($) - 490 1126.667 
DA Bid Price ($/MWh) - 35 35 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) - - - 70 70 70 70 70 70 
E
V
 A
g
g
 
Y
3
 
Expected Profit ($) - 770 1362.667 
DA Bid Price ($/MWh) - 35 35 
RT Offer Prices ($/MWh) - - - 70 70 70 70 70 70 
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Table C.5 
The Results of Demand and Generation Dispatch for Case 1 
 
(MW)  Without EV 100,000 EVs 200,000 EVs 
Demand Curtailment of LSE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Wind Power Deviation  +250 -40 -250 +250 -40 -250 +250 -40 -250 
W
in
d
 
U
n
it
Y
1
 
DA Power 300 300 300 
Wind Power Deviation +200 -20 -150 +200 -20 -150 +200 -20 -150 
Wind Power Curtailment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W
in
d
 
U
n
it
Y
1
 
DA Power 200 200 200 
Wind Power Deviation +50 -20 -100 +50 -20 -100 +50 -20 -100 
Wind Power Curtailment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N
u
cl
ea
r 
U
n
it
Y
1
 
DA Power 1500 1500 1500 
Regulation Up/Down 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RT Power Output 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 
C
o
a
l 
U
n
it
Y
1
 
DA Power 1100 1045.5 1100 
Regulation Up/Down 0 0 0 54.5 54.5 54.5 0 0 0 
RT Power Output 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 
O
il
  
U
n
it
Y
1
 
DA Power 250 250 500 
Regulation Up/Down -100 190 250 250 250 250 -50 0 0 
RT Power Output 150 440 500 500 500 500 500 450 500 
G
a
s 
U
n
it
Y
1
 
DA Power 150 200 365 
Regulation Up/Down -150 -150 0 -190 100 200 -200 35 35 
RT Power Output 0 0 150 10 300 400 165 400 400 
E
V
 A
g
g
 
Y
1
 POP - -364.5 -729 
Regulation Up/Down - - - 0 0 +55 0 5 105 
RT Power Output - - - -364.5 -364.5 -309.5 -729 -724 -624 
E
V
 A
g
g
 
Y
1
 
POP - 0 -729 
Regulation Up/Down - - - -364.5 -364.5 -309.5 0 0 110 
RT Power Output - - - -364.5 -364.5 -309.5 -729 -729 -619 
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Table C.6 
The Results of Demand and Generation Dispatch for Case 2 
 
(MW)  Without EV 100,000 EVs 200,000 EVs 
Demand Curtailment of LSE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Wind Power Deviation +250 -40 -250 +250 -40 -250 +250 -40 -250 
W
in
d
 
U
n
it
Y
1
 
DA Power 0 300 300 
Wind Power Deviation +200 -20 -150 +200 -20 -150 +200 -20 -150 
Wind Power Curtailment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W
in
d
 
U
n
it
Y
2
 
DA Power 0 200 200 
Wind Power Deviation +50 -20 -100 +50 -20 -100 +50 -20 -100 
Wind Power Curtailment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N
u
cl
ea
r 
U
n
it
Y
2
 
DA Power 1500 1500 1500 
Regulation Up/Down 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RT Power Output 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 
C
o
a
l 
U
n
it
Y
1
 
DA Power 1100 1100 1060 
Regulation Up/Down -300 -80 0 0 0 0 0 +40 +40 
RT Power Output 800 1020 1100 1100 1100 1100 1060 1100 1100 
O
il
 
U
n
it
Y
2
 
DA Power 500 455 480 
Regulation Up/Down -250 -180 -100 -50 +20 +45 -50 +20 +20 
RT Power Output 250 320 400 405 475 500 420 500 500 
G
a
s 
U
n
it
Y
1
 
DA Power 400 305 400 
Regulation Up/Down -200 -200 -150 -200 +20 +95 -200 -20 0 
RT Power Output 200 200 250 205 325 400 200 380 400 
E
V
 
A
g
g
Y
1
 POP - -364.5 -729 
Regulation Up/Down - - - 0 0 +55 0 0 +110 
RT Power Output - - - -364.5 -364.5 -309.5 -729 -729 -629 
E
V
 
A
g
g
Y
2
 POP - -364.5 -729 
Regulation Up/Down - - - 0 0 +55 0 0 +80 
RT Power Output - - - 364.5 364.5 -309.5 -729 -729 -649 
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Table C.7 
The Results of Demand and Generation Dispatch for Case 3 
 
(MW) Without EV 100,000 EVs 200,000 EVs 
Demand Curtailment of LSE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Wind Power Deviation +250 -40 -250 +250 -40 -250 +250 -40 -250 
W
in
d
 
U
n
it
 
Y
1
 
DA Power 300 300 300 
Wind Power Deviation +200 -20 -150 +200 -20 -150 +200 -20 -150 
Wind Power Curtailment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W
in
d
 
U
n
it
Y
1
 
DA Power 200 200 200 
Wind Power Deviation +50 -20 -100 +50 -20 -100 +50 -20 -100 
Wind Power Curtailment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N
u
cl
ea
r 
U
n
it
Y
1
 
DA Power 1500 1500 1500 
Regulation Up/Down 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RT Power Output 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 
C
o
a
l 
U
n
it
Y
1
 
DA Power 1100 1050 1100 
Regulation Up/Down 0 0 0 50 50 50 0 0 0 
RT Power Output 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 
O
il
  
U
n
it
 
Y
1
 
DA Power 250 500 450 
Regulation Up/Down -100 190 250 -100 0 0 -50 50 50 
RT Power Output 150 440 500 400 500 500 400 500 500 
G
a
s 
U
n
it
Y
1
 
DA Power 150 200 200 
Regulation Up/Down -150 -150 0 -200 -10 200 -200 -10 200 
RT Power Output 0 0 150 0 190 400 0 400 400 
E
V
 A
g
g
 
Y
2
 
POP - -364.5 -729 
Regulation Up/Down - - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RT Power Output - - - -364.5 -364.5 -364.5 -729 -729 -729 
E
V
 A
g
g
 
Y
2
 
POP - -364.5 -729 
Regulation Up/Down - - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RT Power Output - - - -364.5 -364.5 -364.5 -729 -729 -729 
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Table C.8 
The Results of Demand and Generation Dispatch for Case 4 
 
(MW)  Without EV 100,000 EVs 200,000 EVs 
Demand Curtailment of LSE 150 40 150 163.8 36.36 181.8 34.1 9.52 47.16 
Total Wind Power Deviation +250 +10 -200 +250 -40 -250 +250 -40 -250 
W
in
d
 
U
n
it
Y
1
 
DA Power 300 300 300 
Wind Power Deviation +200 -20 -150 +200 -20 -150 +200 -20 -150 
Wind Power Curtailment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W
in
d
 
U
n
it
Y
1
 
DA Power 150 200 200 
Wind Power Deviation +100 +30 -50 +50 -20 -100 +50 -20 -100 
Wind Power Curtailment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N
u
cl
ea
r 
U
n
it
Y
2
 
DA Power 1500 1500 1500 
Regulation Up/Down 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RT Power Output 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 
C
o
a
l 
U
n
it
Y
2
 
DA Power 1100 1100 1100 
Regulation Up/Down 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RT Power Output 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 
O
il
 
U
n
it
Y
2
 
DA Power 250 250 250 
Regulation Up/Down -250 -250 250 -250 -250 250 -250 -250 +250 
RT Power Output 0 0 500 0 0 500 0 0 500 
G
a
s 
U
n
it
Y
2
 
DA Power 200 200 108 
Regulation Up/Down -200 200 -200 -200 200 -200 -108 +200 -108 
RT Power Output 0 400 0 0 400 0 0 308 0 
E
V
 A
g
g
 
Y
3
 
POP - -364.5 -729 
Regulation Up/Down - - - 36.2 16.81 0 0 80.48 0 
RT Power Output - - - -328.3 -348.3 -364.5 -729 -648.5 -729 
E
V
 A
g
g
 
Y
3
 
POP - -364.5 -729 
Regulation Up/Down - - - 0 36.83 18.2 73.9 0 60.84 
RT Power Output - - - -364.5 -327.6 -346.3 -655.1 -729 -668.1 
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